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 CAN PRIVATISATION AND  COM M ERCIALISATION 
OF PU BLIC SERVICES H ELP ACH IEVE TH E M D Gs?∗ 
AN ASSESSM ENT 
Kate Bayliss∗∗  and  Tim  Kessler∗∗∗ 
ABSTRACT  
Basic services are essential to reducing poverty and im proving quality of life. This working 
paper focuses on health, education, energy and water. These services contribute to achieving 
the M illennium  D evelopm ent G oals, as well as being goals in them selves. O ver the past twenty 
years or so, the way in which these services are provided has been subject to considerable 
policy debate. There has been widespread questioning of the ability of the public sector to 
effectively deliver such services. Largely as a result, m arket-oriented solutions have been 
prom oted as a m eans to overcom e apparent constraints posed by state-provided services.  
N otwithstanding the weaknesses of state provision in m any countries and localities, this 
working paper argues that reliance on private sector provision will fail to address the central 
challenges of public sector delivery. Furtherm ore, the process of privatisation creates an 
incentive fram ework that underm ines, rather than strengthens, the accountability and 
capacity of the State to provide accessible and affordable services. In addition, the paper 
argues that the adoption of full cost recovery policies can seriously threaten achievem ent of 
the M D G s. This position does not constitute a blanket statem ent against private sector 
participation in public services or against user fees. Rather, it m aintains that m arket-led 
policies fail to contribute to the M D G s and often reduce the likelihood of achieving them . 
Strengthening the State in assum ing central responsibility for providing essential public 
services will help correct these setbacks. 
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1  INTROD U CTION  
At a m eeting of the United N ations (U N ) in Septem ber 2000, all 189 M em ber States of the 
United N ations adopted the M illennium  D eclaration. O f these, 147 were represented directly 
by their head of state. The declaration com m itted its signatories to prom ote a series of goals 
for poverty reduction to be achieved by 2015 (U N  M illennium  D eclaration 2000) (see Box 1). 
These M illennium  D evelopm ent G oals (M D G s) are tim e-bound, quantified targets for 
addressing the m any dim ensions of extrem e poverty (such as incom e, shelter, health and 
education) while prom oting gender equality and environm ental sustainability. Furtherm ore, 
som e of these goals, such as access to water and shelter, can be considered to be fundam ental 
hum an rights. Five years later, at the U N  sum m it in 2005, governm ent leaders reaffirm ed their 
com m itm ent to the goals.  
U nfortunately, there has been lim ited progress towards achieving them . The 2005 Social 
Watch Report, which m onitors progress on poverty reduction goals, concludes that if current 
trends continue, the M D G s will not be achieved by 2015. A id agencies tend to be m ore 
optim istic. H owever, they adm it, for exam ple, that if the goal of halving extrem e incom e 
poverty is achieved, it will be alm ost entirely due to advances in Asia.1 For sub-Saharan African 
countries, in particular, the M D G s seem  like a fading dream . By the W orld Bank’s estim ate, the 
average daily incom e of Africans earning less than one dollar per day dropped from  64 cents in 
1981 to 60 cents in 2001 (World D evelopment Indicators 2005).  
1.1  SH IFTIN G  TH E D EBATE 
This working paper exam ines the im pact of m arket-oriented reform  policies on the delivery of 
basic services. There is consensus that achieving the M D G s will require efficient and equitable 
delivery of basic public services, especially water, electricity, health care and education. The 
debate is over the choice of policies. Privatisation and com m ercialisation gained popularity 
during the 1990s as the way to overcom e the perceived deficiencies of the State sector in the 
delivery of basic services. In the last few years, som e of the difficulties with such policies have 
been acknowledged even by those that m ost supported reform s, particularly for privatisation. 
Today the m ain controversy is not so m uch over whether m arket-oriented approaches entail 
risks: they do. Rather, it is whether governm ents should invest in im proving traditional public 
sector service delivery, or establish an institutional fram ework that reduces the risks of opting 
for privatisation and com m ercialisation. 
Two prem ises drive the following analysis. First, the debate over public service reform needs 
to be focused on poverty reduction. Em phasising this does not im ply a rejection of the principles 
of efficiency and fiscal discipline that until recently have dom inated reform  proposals. N or is it 
necessary to categorically reject either user fees or private sector participation. H owever, as 
case after case has shown, service providers can becom e m ore profitable, governm ents can 
save m oney, and the quality of existing services can im prove – without poor people increasing 
their access to or sharing the benefits of these advances.  
The second prem ise of this paper is that achieving poverty reduction goals requires an 
explicit government commitment – including corresponding resources – to provide a m inim um  
level of public services for all citizens. This level need not be the sam e for all governm ents: 
highly im poverished countries and failing states will have different prospects than better 
resourced m iddle-incom e countries. H owever, unless the State defines the range and scope of 
m inim ally acceptable services, as well as its own responsibilities in providing them , it will be 
difficult for citizens to hold their political leaders accountable. 
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Focusing the debate on achieving the M D G s ensures that the priority outcom e of service 
reform  is the im pact on the lives of the poor rather than specific indicators of service 
perform ance. It is worth em phasising that this approach is consistent with som e of the basic 
principles of conventional policy analysis, especially those of m axim ising public spending on 
the poor and increasing the accountability of service providers to service users. But an M D G -
centered approach also sharpens the recognition of the fundam ental challenges to achieving 
poverty reduction goals posed by com m ercialisation and privatisation.  
Rather than em brace fiscal savings as an intrinsic good, such an approach asks what 
equity trade-offs are involved in applying user fees and how the policy will affect affordability. 
In particular, an M D G  focus questions the policy relevance of ‘willingness-to-pay’ surveys that 
show that poor people are willing to use a significant am ount of their own incom e to pay for 
utilities and social services (W ater and Sanitation Program  1999). It is not surprising that low-
incom e people state that they would pay com m ercial rates for basic services when the State 
does not provide them . Such services are central to their livelihood and even survival. 
H owever, paying com m ercial rates inevitably requires poor people to cut back on other 
consum ption: food, clothing, and other com m ercialised services. The fact that people m ay 
m ake sacrifices to survive does not justify a policy that forces them  to m ake those sacrifices. 
BO X 1 
Basic Services and M D Gs 
Effective delivery of core basic services is crucial to achieving the M D G s, both as specific goals in and of 
them selves and as inputs to other targets. Poverty is m ulti-faceted and requires an integrated response 
across sectors. The basic services addressed in this paper have a direct im pact on poverty and interact to 
prom ote specific M D G s. 
Electricity helps reduce poverty by increasing productivity, and im proves health by reducing 
indoor pollution and respiratory ailm ents caused by biom ass heating and cooking. It prom otes 
education by enabling students to work at night and frees children from  the burden of collecting biom ass.   
Im proved access to w ater and sanitation  is an M D G  in its own right, the explicit target being to 
halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 
2015. The provision of water and sanitation contributes m ost directly to health by reducing water-
related disease and associated child m ortality. Better health, in turn, leads to higher productivity and 
reduced poverty. As with electricity, water access frees children (especially girls) from  collection chores 
and im proves the prospects for spending tim e studying. W ater access is also an essential elem ent of 
gender equality, easing the burden of collection and tim e spent caring for sick children. Accessible 
sanitation facilities also put wom en and girls at less risk of sexual assault.  
The second M D G  aim s to provide com plete prim ary education  by 2015 for all children. Prim ary 
education contributes to poverty reduction by im proving productivity and the ability to adapt to a 
changing labour m arket. Education is also associated with the use of contraception and access to 
prenatal care, reducing m aternal and child m ortality. Literacy program s in general im prove hygiene, 
reduce the risk of H IV and prom ote the appropriate use of m edicines.  
Finally, health care is an elem ent of three M D G s: reduced child m ortality, im proved m aternal 
health and the reduction of H IV/AID S, m alaria and other diseases. In addition, im proved access to health 
care contributes to poverty reduction. In particular, health care reduces the likelihood of prolonged 
illness or prem ature death, which can have a devastating and perm anent im pact on household incom e. 
It also contributes to the quality of education by im proving school attendance (of both students and 
teachers) and m ental concentration.  
Source: U nited N ations, M illennium D evelopment Goals Indicator D atabase, 2006. Available at  
<http://m illennium indicators.un.org/unsd/m i/m i_goals.asp>. 
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An M D G  focus exam ines the relevant challenges and constraints in each sector and 
addresses them  with an ‘unblinkered’ approach that carefully weighs the options of either 
private or public provision. It also entails a balanced analysis of the financial requirem ents for 
each approach, bearing in m ind the different revenue-raising abilities of public and private 
actors. W hile the private sector m ight have easier access to international capital, for exam ple, 
this is often at higher cost than governm ent funds. Thus, in m any cases, strengthening public 
sector provision could be the preferable option. 
1.2  TH E STATE’S RO LE IN  PRO VID IN G  SERVICES 
A lthough the M D G s are ostensibly about poverty reduction, in a broader sense they represent 
an effort to define a m inim ally acceptable ‘social contract’ between governm ent and citizens. 
The core of the contract is progress toward universal provision of public services that satisfy 
basic hum an needs and are prerequisites for individuals to realize their hum an potential. 
H owever, the M D G s are silent on how governm ents should fulfill that contract, or even which 
institutions – public or private – should be responsible for providing these basic services. 
This working paper explores how privatisation, com m ercialisation, and governm ent 
provision affect the im plicit term s of a social contract for service provision, as well as the 
degree to which those term s are fulfilled. A t one extrem e, a purely m arket-oriented approach 
m ight define universal provision as access to services for anyone who can afford to pay full 
costs. In this case, com m ercialisation of access violates the spirit of universal provision by 
m aking access contingent on sufficient incom e. A t the other extrem e, the State m ight prom ise 
universal access to a wide array of services without im posing a rationing m echanism  on 
quantity or quality.  
W hile the first approach m akes a m ockery of universal service provision, the second 
approach is doom ed by inevitably scarce resources. In the absence of criteria for rationing or 
focusing resources, social and political factors often allocate public services disproportionately 
to urban elites or specific groups with social or political connections to governm ent. In this 
m anner, the grand pretensions of com prehensive universal provision can end up becom ing 
highly regressive in practice. 
A ll people need water, but do they need a household connection, a yard tap or proxim ity 
to a com m unity standpipe? A ll people need education to fulfill their productive potential – but 
how m any years? A ll people need access to m edical care, but the range of health care services 
varies from  basic vaccination to sophisticated curative treatm ents. D eclaring the right to such 
services m ight serve legitim ate social and political ideals; however, unless those rights are 
specifically defined and linked to financial resources, there is little reason to expect that they 
will translate into benefits for citizens, especially those who have been traditionally excluded 
from  public services.  
It is widely accepted, at least in principle, that the State should be responsible for m aking 
the m ost essential services available to everyone. Som e decades back in the developing world 
(and today in m any developed countries), that responsibility had been defined as direct 
governm ent provision of services. These services have been widely regarded as public goods, 
and paid for with central governm ent funds. H owever, during the 1990s, as m arket reform s 
becam e popular am ong developm ent institutions and governm ents, the State’s responsibility 
was re-defined as the regulator of private sector providers. Public services were increasingly 
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seen as benefits accruing prim arily to individuals and households, and therefore required 
private paym ent through user fees that were high enough to cover costs.  
The transform ation of the State’s role has its analog in the transform ation of the service 
user: from  citizen to consum er. W hile citizens hold leaders accountable through elections and 
political m obilisation, consum ers hold service providers accountable through individual 
spending decisions and, if service quality or price is unacceptable, by switching to another 
provider (when possible). Proponents of m arket reform  often argue that political leaders are 
able to avoid accountability. They conclude that while citizens have weak political resources, 
consum ers can dem and better services by giving pricing signals in the m arket.  
H owever, m arket-oriented solutions to accountability are plagued by at least three m ajor 
problem s. First, to the extent that spending decisions discipline service providers, those with 
little or no incom e can be excluded from  public services. O ften the poor cannot even becom e 
consum ers due to their inability to pay for services. Second, the consum er’s strongest signal, 
the decision to change providers, cannot be used for services that are natural m onopolies, 
such as water and electricity utilities. Finally, private provision of public services requires 
effective regulation by states, which often have weak governance institutions and little 
experience in m onitoring or enforcing com plex contracts.  
U ltim ately, states are responsible for prom oting universal access to essential public 
services. But doing that requires resources. G overnm ents with deficient services cannot 
prom ise access for everyone in the short term . H owever, they can articulate goals for 
progressively achieving universal access, and dedicate the resources required for doing so. 
This is what the M D G s have been created to encourage. 
For every developing country in the world, raising sufficient revenue from  a resistant and 
largely im poverished citizenry is a key obstacle. After all, why should people spend m ore of 
their incom e on a governm ent that has already failed to provide basic services? Even well-
intentioned governm ents thus face a political Catch-22: m ore revenue is needed to im prove 
and expand services, but im proved and expanded services are needed to justify increased 
taxation. Thus, a downward spiral of both declining revenue and service can result.  
International donors can help by financing up-front investm ents, especially for 
construction of infrastructure. H owever, to m ake universal service delivery sustainable, the 
State m ust ultim ately assum e responsibility for covering recurrent costs, ideally through 
general revenues, and for certain kinds of consum ption, possibly through user fees. By first 
expanding access and providing tangible benefits for excluded or neglected groups, the 
State can better justify higher levels of taxation. Procuring those resources is essential, 
however. A s all too m any developm ent projects have shown, one of the m ost discouraging 
scenarios is spending or borrowing huge sum s of m oney to create services that only fall later 
into disrepair and disuse.  
In the rest of this working paper, we attem pt to cover a broad range of topics. Section 2 
exam ines the variety of options associated with m arket-oriented reform s. Section 3 evaluates 
the drawbacks of such reform s, particularly with regard to achievem ent of the M D G s. Section 4 
docum ents the lack of em pirical support for privatization, as well as for com m ercialization. 
Section 5 reviews the potential sources of financing for the provision of essential public 
services. Section 6 exam ines the role of civic engagem ent in strengthening the public 
provision of services. Section 7 provides a conclusion. 
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2  M ARKET-ORIENTED  REFORM S: TH E VARIETY OF OPTIONS 
O ver the past two decades or so, there has been a growing policy focus on the perceived 
problem s of State inefficiencies. Recent efforts to reform  public services seek to reduce the role 
of the State, either by scaling back public financing or through the governm ent’s direct role in 
service provision. H owever, the nature and scope of such reform s vary considerably. W hile 
there are num erous form s of m arket-based reform s, the m ost basic distinction is between 
com m ercialisation and privatisation.  
Broadly speaking, commercialisation is the process of transform ing a transaction into a 
com m ercial activity, in which goods or services acquire a m onetary value. U nder this approach, 
a service provider seeks to cover m ost or all of its costs directly from  individual (or household) 
service users. The reduction or elim ination of subsidies is a com m on form  of com m ercialisation. 
A t a bare m inim um , com m ercialisation can sim ply require that basic operations and 
m aintenance are covered by sufficient revenue from  consum ers. A  m ore expansive approach 
covers replacem ent cost for depreciating assets. The broadest definition includes the capital 
outlays for expanding and upgrading network connections to all users or constructing new 
facilities and covering the debt servicing costs associated with borrowing funds for this 
purpose (Revels 2005). 
A  m ore controversial reform  is privatisation, in which a private com pany takes over som e 
or all operational responsibilities, and is com pensated either through user fees or a fee-for-
service paid by the governm ent. Privatisation reform s that m ake profitability contingent on 
user fees entail com m ercialisation by their very nature. G overnm ent regulation of private 
services focuses largely on how m uch firm s m ay charge to earn a ‘fair’ return on investm ent. 
Increasing the num ber of private sector operators in order to generate com petition – especially 
when only a governm ent provider exists – is also a form  of privatisation. If governm ents could 
ensure robust com petition am ong qualified providers of services used by the poor, reform  
could conceivably im prove service quality and reduce price. H owever, as discussed below,  
the m onopolistic nature of key basic services is one factor that m akes com petition difficult  
to achieve in practice. M oreover, effective regulation will still be necessary even when 
com petitive conditions exist. 
2.1  W H Y H AVE TH ESE PO LICIES BEEN  AD O PTED ?  
There are several reasons why m arket-oriented reform s have been prom oted and adopted. 
A lthough service reform  policies vary significantly, they are broadly inspired by an intellectual 
m ovem ent in public adm inistration called N ew Public M anagem ent (N PM ). N PM  borrows 
heavily from  public choice econom ics, the m ain prem ise of which is that governm ent services 
fail because of a ‘principal agent’ problem : political and bureaucratic leaders control inform ation 
and resources that allow them  to pursue their own individual aim s and am bitions, rather than 
operating in the public interest. Adherents of N PM  m aintain that public services can becom e 
m ore accountable and efficient when run according to m arket principles – that is, when 
providers respond to m arket incentives.  
The argum ents underlying com m ercialisation and privatisation policies are sim ilar but not 
identical. Broadly speaking, com m ercialisation addresses a revenue problem , while privatisation 
addresses either long-term  investm ent constraints, governance weaknesses, or both. In som e 
cases, privatisation m ay be adopted as an instrum ent to achieve com m ercialisation itself – that 
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is, to elim inate fiscal losses stem m ing from  public subsidies. The popularity of m arket-based 
approaches stem s largely from  a growing dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the State as 
a service provider. H owever, as discussed below, global institutions play a central role in 
pressuring borrowing governm ents to adopt N PM  reform s in public services. But from  an  
M D G  perspective, the track record of m arket-based reform s has not lived up to the am bitious 
expectations of its prom oters. 
Com m ercialisation 
Com m ercialisation often signals an effort to cut fiscal deficits or generate m ore financial 
resources for the service itself. It can also discourage profligate use (as for exam ple in the water 
sector). Com m ercialisation is perceived as an economic solution to the problem  of scarce 
resources. Finance m inistries often prom ote com m ercialisation to slash subsidies. Fiscal 
pressures can be so strong that financially viable and well-perform ing utilities are sold off to 
produce large ‘one tim e’ increases in governm ent revenue. W hen a governm ent is intent on 
privatising a service, an increase in user fees is often a prior step that m akes the enterprise 
m ore attractive to potential private owners.  
In som e cases, public services are provided – in principle – to all users, including the non-poor, 
free of charge or at highly subsidized rates. But evidence suggests that public service 
subsidies tend to benefit the m iddle class disproportionately (W orld Bank 2002a, Gwatkin 
2003). For peri-urban residents without form al utility connections or the rural poor who live 
far from  governm ent-funded services, lack of service access precludes them  from  benefiting 
from  subsidies. U ser fees are thus often prom oted as a distributionally progressive reform  
that could generate m ore incom e and direct it to services and program s that poor people do 
use. H owever, the rationale for user fees tends to be m ore com m on for utilities than for health 
care and education.  
Privatisation 
The rationale for privatisation m ight include fiscal discipline, but often goes beyond the need for 
resources. Reform ers often point to the inefficiency and poor quality of public sector services  
as the rationale for a change in ownership. They present private sector participation as an 
institutional solution to poor governance. In the annals of public provision, poor governance has 
been portrayed in m any ways: bureaucratic inertia and disincentives to innovate, low technical 
and m anagerial capacity at all levels of service delivery, lack of accountability to consum ers, 
absence of incentives for workers to perform , political constraints to laying off under-perform ing 
or unneeded workers, and rent-seeking and corruption. In short, the institutional rationale for 
privatisation characterizes the private sector as being m ore com petent, innovative and 
accountable than the public sector. 
Proponents of privatization often advertise that the m ost com pelling argum ent for 
privatisation is poverty reduction. The initial logic of the link to poverty points to a potential 
increase in fiscal space for pro-poor program s. As governm ent saves m oney by withdrawing 
subsidies from  ‘loss-m aking’ public utilities, it can direct those resources (as well as lum p sum  
revenues from  sales) toward m ore deserving public services, especially health care, education 
and basic social security. H owever, leaving aside for the m om ent the em pirical question of 
how m uch fiscal space is actually opened up through privatisation, there is little reason to 
expect that poor people who have been politically neglected for decades will suddenly 
becom e the prim ary beneficiaries of increased revenues. 
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M ore recently, privatisation proponents have argued that there is a direct link to poverty 
reduction. Particularly in the case of poor people who lack connections to basic utilities, som e 
advocates have m aintained that private sector participation can help the poor sim ply through 
expanding access (Birdsall and N ellis 2002). There is evidence that access can im prove after 
privatisation. H owever, as discussed below, the source of that expansion is typically related 
m ore to traditional public resources than to investm ent m ade by private providers them selves. 
Privatisation can also em erge spontaneously as a result of a weak State. In the absence of 
adequate public provision, citizens are forced to use private providers. For exam ple, where 
people lack access to piped water or natural water sources, they often pay very high per-unit 
prices for bottled or tanker-delivered water supplied by private vendors. Social services are no 
exception. “W hile India has a well developed prim ary health system  in theory, in practice, 
access to services is com prom ised by high rates of health worker absenteeism  and often 
inadequate supplies and poor infrastructure. This leads the m ajority of the population to turn 
to largely unregulated private providers” (U N M P: 163).  
The Role of the W orld Bank 
A  key reason for developing country governm ents to privatise is the persuasiveness and power 
of international donors that support the policy. Am ong the global institutions that prom ote 
econom ic developm ent, none has m ore substantive im pact over policies affecting public 
service delivery than the W orld Bank. N ot only is the Bank the world’s largest donor, but it also 
conducts and produces research with a volum e and scope unequaled by any other institution. 
Through financial resources, contracting of scores of consultants, and its self-styled role as the 
world’s ‘knowledge bank’, the W orld Bank influences m uch of the policy agenda for regional 
and bilateral developm ent agencies, borrowing governm ents and the academ ic com m unity.  
The W orld Bank increasingly prom oted m arket-oriented reform s in basic service sectors 
throughout the 1990s. Service privatisation becam e a central pillar in the Bank’s approach to 
developm ent with the April 2002 approval of the Private Sector D evelopm ent (PSD ) strategy. 
Providing a general fram ework for the Bank’s other sector strategies, the PSD  strategy 
explicitly designates services such as infrastructure, education and health care as ‘frontier’ 
sectors for private investm ent. In its 2004 W orld D evelopm ent Report, the Bank m aintains that 
governm ent's role in infrastructure sectors should generally be lim ited to regulation and pro-
poor subsidies, asserting that “there are few advantages to the governm ent's providing 
[infrastructure] service itself . . .” (p. 16). 
As another exam ple, the Bank’s 1997 health sector strategy states that “in low and m iddle 
incom e countries, weak institutional capacity to deal effectively with regulatory problem s in 
the private sector often causes governm ents to becom e excessively involved in the direct 
production of health services” (quoted in Abbasi 1999). Accordingly, “the Bank has m ade 
num erous loans to support m anaged care initiatives that convert public health institutions . . . 
to private m anagem ent and/or ownership” (Iriart et. al. 2004). 
The Bank’s private sector arm , the International Finance Corporation (IFC), conducts 
num erous prom otion and guarantee program s that steer private investm ent toward basic 
public services. Its health care portfolio has grown from  15 com panies and an investm ent of 
U S$ 67 m illion in 2000 to 32 com panies in 23 countries with an investm ent of U S$ 220 m illion 
in 2005 – excluding pharm aceuticals. These activities include loans and m inority equity 
positions in projects that include general and speciality hospitals, diagnostic services (such as 
laboratory and im aging), hem odialysis, am bulatory care and m anaged care (Ellena 2005).  
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In education, the IFC considers proposals from  private sector sponsors that target large-
scale school projects in developing countries. It currently holds over half a billion dollars in 
infrastructure investm ents, including num erous water and wastewater projects. The W orld 
Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database provides inform ation on over 3,200 
projects with private investm ent that it has financed in energy, water, telecom  and transport. 
(See Tables 1 and 2). 
TABLE 1 
W orld Bank Investm ent in w ater and sew erage projects by region and year of investm ent  
(U S$ m illion) 
Year of 
investment 
East Asia 
and 
Pacific 
Europe 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Middle 
East and 
North 
Africa 
South Asia 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Total 
Investment 
1991-1995 3,414 38 5,717 0 0 0 9,168 
1996-2000 12,299 2,781 11,546 0 0 133 26,758 
2001-2005 3,496 1,280 3,709 711 2 12 9,209 
Total 19,207 4,098 20,971 711 2 146 45,134 
Percentage 
of total 42.6% 9.1% 46.5% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 100%  
Source: Private Participation in Public Infrastructure, W orld Bank and PPIAF, available at  
<http://ppi.worldbank.org/ explore/ppi_exploreSector.aspx?sectorID =4>. 
 
As shown in Table 1 for 1991-2005, the great m ajority of W orld Bank financing of private 
projects in water and severage, i.e., alm ost 90 per cent, has been in East Asia and the Pacific and 
Latin Am erica and the Caribbean. About nine per cent has been in the transition econom ies of 
Europe and the CIS. But the highpoint of W orld Bank financing in these sectors was during  
1996-2000, when it provided about U S$ 26.7 billion. Its financing declined to U S$ 9.2 billion 
during 2001-2005. 
Tables 2 shows a som ewhat m ore diversified picture for W orld Bank financing of private 
energy projects during 1990-2004. East Asia and the Pacific and Latin Am erica and the 
Caribbean have accounted for about three-quarters of all financing. Europe and the CIS follow 
with about 11 per cent and South Asia with alm ost nine per cent. Sim ilar to the pattern in 
water and sewerage, the highpoint of W orld Bank financing of energy projects, nam ely, 
reaching a total of U S$ 148.5 billion, was during 1995-1999. Its financing dropped to U S$ 92.7 
billion during 2000-2004.  
For both water and sewerage and energy, W orld Bank financing of private projects in sub-
Saharan Africa has been nil. Its financing of water and sewerage in South Asia has also been 
m iniscule. This illustrates the general pattern of the lack of private investm ent in infrastructure in 
poorer countries. It is difficult to m otivate private investors to place projects in such countries. 
In addition to creating institutional m echanism s and resources specifically dedicated to 
private sector developm ent, the Bank affects basic services through explicit loan conditions 
that introduce or expand private sector participation in water and electricity. The m ost highly 
publicized and politicized conditions have been in the water sector, which has seen som e of 
the m ost aggressive privatisation and som e of m ost spectacular privatisation failures 
(ActionA id 2004, M acCuish 2003, CCO D P 2005). The Bank has also established privatisation 
conditions for electricity generation and m anagem ent of electricity utilities (D ubash 2003).  
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TABLE 2 
W orld Bank Investm ent in energy projects by region and year of investm ent  
(U S$ m illion) 
Year of 
investment 
East Asia 
and Pacific 
Europe 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Middle 
East and 
North 
Africa 
South Asia 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Total 
Investment 
1990-1994 16,740 1,524 13,048 3,132 3,763 139 38,344 
1995-1999 42,661 13,813 69,681 6,968 12,294 3,152 148,565 
2000-2004 19,667 16,344 40,591 3,891 8,233 3,908 92,663 
Total 79,097 31,681 123,320 13,991 24,288 7,198 279,574 
Percentage 
of total 28.3% 11.2% 44.1% 5.0% 8.7% 0.0 100% 
Source: Private Participation in Public Infrastructure, W orld Bank and PPIAF, available at  
<http://ppi.worldbank.org/  explore/ppi_exploreSector.aspx?sectorID =2>. 
3  TH E D RAW BACKS – AND  IM PLICATIONS – FOR M D Gs 
Privatisation and com m ercialisation are intended to im prove service delivery, prim arily as a 
result of greater efficiency and im m unity from  political m anipulation. H owever, there are 
num erous difficulties associated with these policies that range from  challenges in 
im plem entation to its destructive im pact on State capacity. Furtherm ore, these policies  
have been oriented around efficiency. Issues of equity and social justice have been largely 
neglected or treated as having secondary im portance.  
3.1  ATTRACTIN G  IN VESTO RS 
A  m ajor stum bling block in the privatisation process em erges if no investors are interested in 
what is being privatised. Based on m arket incentives alone, private sector investm ent does not 
go to the areas of greatest need. G overnm ents in low-incom e countries often have to m ake 
trade-offs and com prom ises in order to attract international capital into basic service delivery. 
International firm s, in particular, require certain prerequisites before investing their own capital. 
In addition to good infrastructure, a safe physical environm ent and a capable workforce, they 
often dem and tax and contract arrangem ents that m inim ize or even elim inate com m ercial risk. 
Bringing foreign direct investm ent (FD I) into infrastructure in poor countries can be 
particularly challenging because of the high levels of investm ent required, the long payback 
period and the potential political difficulty in charging tariffs that ensure a com m ercial return. 
The frequency with which water and sanitation concessions in both developing and 
industrialized countries have been postponed or cancelled in recent years is evidence of how 
difficult it is to design and im plem ent successful private sector involvem ent in water supply 
and sanitation services. For exam ple, over half of the 307 contracts signed for private sector 
participation in the transport and water sectors between 1989 and 2000 in five Latin Am erican 
countries (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colom bia and M exico) were renegotiated (Guasch, et. al. 2005).  
Private investm ent in the social sectors is also problem atic, particularly for services used 
prim arily by the poor. The m ost publicized exam ple of investor apathy in the health sector is 
developm ent of drugs that treat ailm ents that prim arily afflict poor people, such as m alaria or 
tuberculosis. W hile private capital finances m any health care facilities, it is targeted prim arily at 
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urban hospitals and clinics that serve custom ers who are able to pay com m ercial prices, often 
for highly sophisticated services. H ealth services for peri-urban and rural people rem ain alm ost 
exclusively delivered by the State and non-profit organizations. 
Various m easures have been adopted to m ake the provision of infrastructure and basic 
services m ore attractive to private sector investors. H owever, these can work against the 
interests of the poor. For exam ple, prices can be increased in the run-up to privatisation. This 
m ay contribute to financial sustainability, but in som e cases, prices have been raised to beyond 
cost-recovery level not only to m ake the operation attractive to investors, but also to m ake 
subsequent price reductions appear to be a gain from  privatization. This was the case with 
water privatisations in Buenos A ires (Loftus and M cD onald 2002) and M anila (D um ol 2002).  
Second, private providers can be allowed to focus on the consum ers or regions that are 
m ost likely to be able to pay. Specific districts can be ‘ring-fenced’, for exam ple, in the delivery 
of water and sanitation services. U tility concessions alm ost invariably begin with the coverage 
of those with existing connections – typically households with form al land titles and higher 
incom es. Provisions to extend private service coverage to those who are m ore difficult to reach 
or with less incom e typically require significant com m itm ents of public resources.   
So-called ‘cherry-picking’ m eans that the State is left with the less profitable and m ore 
challenging areas or with consum ers without the revenue from  the m ore lucrative areas. In the 
power sector, for exam ple: “O ne …  possible consequence of private power participation in a 
sm all econom y is that independent power generation m ay rem ove high-load factor custom ers 
from  the grid system . This is likely to result in increasing the cost of serving the rem aining 
custom ers and thus in m ore defections, with higher costs and lower system  reliability to be 
borne by the econom y in general” (Chiwaya 1999: 305). 
3.2  RISK ALLO CATIO N  
Risk is a m ajor concern for private investors when they take over provision of public services. 
W ith regard to capital-intensive public services, private firm s are so risk-averse that they 
require explicit guarantees of long-term  profitability. An array of instrum ents called ‘fiscal 
supports’ is used to attract uncertain investors into risky m arkets. These include cash subsidies, 
in-kind grants, tax breaks, direct capital contributions, as well as guarantees against risks that 
are not even under governm ent control (Irwin 2003). 
To appease the concerns of investors, contracts are increasingly designed to m inim ize risk 
exposure for the private sector.2 Im portantly, risk does not disappear, but rather is borne by 
the developing country governm ent – or directly by consum ers. Furtherm ore, because private 
investors in infrastructure require long term  predictability, contractual arrangem ents are often 
set for a protracted period and the private firm  then has little incentive to m odify activities to 
take account of changing circum stances. G iven that private firm s are nervous about risky 
investm ents in developing countries, they seek com fort in contractual guarantees that virtually 
ensure profitability. In an extensive review of private health care provision in developing 
countries, the W orld H ealth O rganisation found that contractual risk was often shifted onto 
governm ent, “putting no pressure on contractors to be efficient” (W H O  1998: 24). 
In the energy sector, so-called Power Purchase Agreem ents (PPAs) can require public 
utilities to buy 100 percent of electricity produced from  a private generator, in hard currency – 
regardless of fluctuations in dem and or exchange rate value. PPAs ensure long-term  
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profitability for private generators, and can expose governm ents to huge fiscal risks and losses 
that cannot be restructured through re-negotiation. In other words, PPAs can virtually 
elim inate the prospect of com m ercial risk. For exam ple, a case study of energy sector reform  in 
Bangladesh concludes: “From  a policy perspective, such long term  contractual obligations, 
especially overly-generous ones, are an inadequate substitute for a proper regulatory 
structure” (PU RC 1999).  
The consequences of investor-friendly policies can have serious im plications for fiscal 
stability, which, ironically, was one of the original justifications for privatisation itself. W hile 
privatisation is supposedly associated with the inflow of funds, risk-free contracts and 
guarantees require governm ents to underwrite private sector projects. For instance, as a result 
of a com bination of the devaluation of the currency and econom ic contraction in Asia in the 
1990s, governm ents were faced with m ounting bills to power com panies while dom estic 
revenue fell.   
W hile som e privatisation proponents are m ore than willing to use the public purse to 
attract private sector participation to infrastructure, those who have studied the financial 
instrum ents in this area are far m ore circum spect. A  senior econom ist at the W orld Bank 
warned that risk guarantees dam pen private sector incentives to m anage efficiently and can 
becom e costly, while also arguing that protection against currency fluctuation m ight, in fact, 
encourage investors to take unwarranted exchange rate risks (Thobani 1999). An analyst at the 
Asian D evelopm ent Bank has explicitly advised borrowing governm ents not to provide 
guarantees for water projects (Blanc-Brude 2004).  
3.3  REGULATIO N  N EED S IN FO RM ATIO N   
W ater and energy projects require large capital investm ents that require m any years to recover. 
Corporations want rules that allow them  to charge prices high enough to turn a profit, as well 
as assurances that governm ent will not interfere in their pricing decisions once investm ents 
have been m ade. In other words, they want to ensure that governm ent regulators do not deny 
them  opportunities to m ake a profit.  
The regulatory system  determ ines who shoulders basic kinds of risk in infrastructure projects 
due to various factors: design and developm ent; construction; operations (cost overruns, delays); 
financing (changes in exchange rates and interest rates); politics (changes in governm ent policy); 
dem and shocks that affect consum ption; and the natural environm ent. Regulations governing 
these risks can becom e a m ajor constraint on private sector participation in infrastructure.  
In the United States, when a utility requests a tariff increase, an experienced regulatory 
com m ission typically reviews the request at a public forum  in which business, consum ers, 
unions and com m unities m ay present their own findings and pose questions (Palast, et. al. 
2003). In m ost developing countries, where nothing close to this process exists, regulators 
have two basic choices for responding to dem ands for price increases: grant the request, 
which m ay be totally unjustified, or deny it, thereby incurring the wrath of the private sector 
and dam aging the ‘investm ent clim ate’, which the international developm ent institutions 
claim  that poor countries m ust nurture in order to attract foreign capital. Regulators always 
face an inherent tension between the political and social desire to keep prices low and the 
dem and by private firm s to ensure that prices are allowed to increase in line with costs.  
Kate Bayliss  and  Tim  Kessler 13 
 
Private providers have strong incentives to lim it what regulators know about the utilities 
they operate. According to a W orld Bank researcher on infrastructure: “The fundam ental 
problem  of regulation is one of asym m etric inform ation between the regulated com pany and 
the regulatory agency. The regulated com pany will have a strong incentive to abuse [its] 
strategic advantage by under-supplying inform ation or distorting the inform ation supplied” 
(Foster 2003). Two infrastructure specialists elaborate on this problem  of calculating operating 
costs: “If the regulator uses firm -specific inform ation [to set prices], the com pany m ay be 
tem pted to change som e of its accounting outcom es to affect regulatory behavior”  
(Burns and Estache 1999).  
Som e privatisation proponents regard governm ents that are unwilling to allow firm s to 
charge higher prices as hopelessly unrealistic. Another W orld Bank infrastructure specialist 
com plains about governm ent resistance to private profit: “This is not to say that private 
com panies with a m onopoly to supply water services should be allowed to take any level of 
profit that they choose. But governm ents should be realistic about the profits that they should 
allow, recognizing the need of their private partners to earn a reasonable return and to be 
rewarded for the risks that they shoulder” (Brook Cowen 1997). The problem  is that this 
approach avoids the central problem  facing weak regulators; they do not know  what price is 
realistic, fair or reasonable. And what is a realistic price in a m iddle-incom e country m ight be 
decidedly unrealistic in a poor country.  
3.4  REGULATIO N  N EED S EFFECTIVE IN STITUTIO N S  
An effective and credible regulatory fram ework is required to protect the interests of 
consum ers and the State, as well as investors. It is particularly im portant for investors in 
infrastructure, where services are often characterized by large sunk investm ent costs, and for 
consum ers of services that are provided in a m onopolistic m arket. There are two m ain aspects 
to regulation – the econom ic dim ension (such as pricing and productivity) and the quality 
dim ension. Regulation can be applied not only to privatised service providers, but also to 
State-owned providers. H owever, private sector investors can create a particular incentive 
fram ework that allows them  to conceal inform ation and m anipulate costs to m axim ize profit.   
There is an extensive literature on the relative m erits of alternative types of regulation. 
The m ost com m on distinction is between ‘cost-plus’ (or ‘rate of return’) regulation and price 
caps. W hile m ost econom ists prefer price caps, citing greater incentives to increase efficiency, 
in practice, both kinds of regulation share fundam ental sim ilarities, requiring extensive 
m onitoring of costs to function effectively (Jouravlev 2000). In addition, regulation needs to be 
set in the wider context of the legal fram ework and the legitim acy of the regim e. But there are 
som e generally accepted clear param eters that need to be in place for effective regulation of 
basic service providers (e.g., transparency, independence and accountability).  
U nfortunately, a lot of advice from  industrialized countries becom es irrelevant when 
applied to low-incom e countries with weak institutions. M any developing countries have 
(under pressure from  donors and financial advisers) im ported regulatory regim es from  
industrialized countries, such as the U K and U SA , which rely heavily on inform ation, technical 
expertise and transparent institutional norm s. Such m odels are rarely adapted to take account 
of conditions in developing countries, where, for exam ple, the advanced accounting, auditing 
and taxation system s required are largely absent.  
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According to the W orld Bank’s 1998 publication Privatisation in Africa, “In not one country 
with a privatisation program  has there been an effort to develop a regulatory fram ework as an 
integral part of that program .” Sim ilarly, econom ist M anuel Angel Abdala concluded in his 
study of Latin Am erican privatisation: “W idespread privatisation has been encouraged all over 
the region. W ith a few exceptions, however, the transfer of ownership was hurried or 
perform ed under constraints im posed by econom ic and political objectives that tended to 
overlook the im portance of regulating private m onopolies” (both quotes from  Bangura 2000).  
W hen the State is unable to m onitor service perform ance, consum ers are vulnerable to 
over-pricing or low-quality service delivery – or both. For exam ple, in India the private health 
sector has grown without any oversight or coordination and is largely unregulated. Several 
studies indicate that parts of the for-profit private sector are involved in unnecessary 
procedures, such as high rates of caesarian sections, unwarranted tests and surgeries (W orld 
Bank 2004). In the water sector, regulators are usually unable to com pel firm s to disclose 
inform ation about perform ance or prices. Yet without such data, it is not possible to verify, for 
exam ple, if cost-based tariff increases are justified. In G abon, the regulator found it difficult to 
m onitor the activities of the private operator: “In the absence of regulatory and m onitoring 
tools to enforce quality…  it is very difficult to ascertain the potential for further im provem ents 
and the overall efficiency of the com pany” (Trem olet and N eale 2002: 51).  
A  num ber of solutions to the problem  of weak regulatory capacity have been 
suggested, perhaps m ost notably the outsourcing of regulation itself (Trem olet et. al. 2004). 
A lternatively, the W orld Bank is exploring the possibilities of form ing expert panels for 
regulating water com panies (Shugart and Balance 2005). H owever, such approaches raise 
the age-old question of who regulates the regulators. A t som e point a capable State m ust 
assum e overall regulatory authority.  
3.5  PRIVATISATIO N  IS N O T CO M PETITIO N  
Reform ers have prom oted m arket-oriented policies in public services based largely on the 
assum ed benefits of com petition. H owever, com petition does not spontaneously em erge from  
privatisation. Rather, it requires relatively low barriers to entry. Infrastructure services that 
require very large capital expenditures to start up are not likely to attract m any com petitors in 
poor countries. For com petition to be effective, there is usually a need for governm ent 
regulation to prevent collusive pricing behavior.  
For the basic services assessed in this paper, m arket structure and m arket failures m ilitate 
against the achievem ent of genuine com petition, especially in weak institutional 
environm ents and in the absence of a vigilant regulator. W hile we m ake the case that 
expanding and im proving access to each service is crucial for achieving the M D G s, the various 
service sectors exhibit im portant econom ic differences that affect the likelihood that 
com petition will contribute to poverty reduction goals.  
The size and ‘lum piness’ of investm ent affect the num ber of potential suppliers. U tilities 
tend to be natural m onopolies, while social services are not. W ater and sanitation services, as 
well as electricity transm ission and distribution, have m onopolistic traits due to their delivery 
over a single network. But there can be m any hospitals, doctors’ offices, m edical labs, schools 
and training centres – although not necessarily m any m edical insurance providers. O ne 
potentially com petitive utility sector is electricity generation, since m any generators can sell 
energy to the sam e grid. But in practice, utilities are rarely com petitive because of the need for 
investors to have investm ents underwritten by long-term  guarantees.    
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Privatisation proponents m aintain that all basic services can be im proved through 
increased form s of com petition. In the case of utilities, they argue that com petition in the 
bidding process itself helps reduce utility prices for consum ers. In the case of health care, 
education, and electricity generation, privatisation advocates argue that consum ers benefit 
from  direct com petition: low barriers to entry and the ability to choose am ong m ultiple 
suppliers. The following sections assess special econom ic characteristics of each service sector 
in order to evaluate claim s about the benefits of com petitiveness. 
3.5.1  W ater and Electricity U tilities: Com petition for the M arket? 
Proponents of privatised utilities acknowledge that there can be no com petition ‘in the 
m arket’ for natural m onopolies. Instead, they argue that com petition for the m arket – am ong 
bidders who seek to m anage or operate utilities – is still a powerful force for im proving 
financial perform ance and quality. The idea is that in order to win the contract, com panies will 
subm it bids com m itting them selves to high perform ance and low prices, locking in the 
benefits for consum ers when the contract is awarded. 
The preconditions for such com petition are daunting. First, a sufficient num ber of 
qualified firm s m ust participate in the bidding process. But water delivery is one of the m ost 
concentrated businesses in the world, for exam ple. Just two firm s account for well over half of 
global private provision. N ot surprisingly, m ost developing countries sim ply do not have 
dom estic firm s with experience in building or running large com plex utilities. Evidence 
suggests that in m any cases, transnational infrastructure firm s link up with dom estic 
com panies in poor countries because of their political influence, rather than their expertise in 
the sector (Bayliss, H all and Corral 2001). 
Another factor affecting com petition is how often re-bidding occurs. According to the 
W orld Bank’s Private Sector D evelopm ent strategy, “The benefits of com petition [for the 
m arket] are likely to be greatest if the contracts are re-bid frequently.” H owever, this ideal is 
not realistic for all kinds of private provision: “Frequent re-bidding is less feasible where the 
private sector is required to provide the bulk of the investm ent capital. Re-bidding concession-
type contracts requires highly detailed provisions for the transfer of, and com pensation for, 
assets funded by the incum bent concessionaire” (W orld Bank 2002b). 
The W orld Bank’s analysis serves as a useful initial basis for establishing preconditions that 
prom ote com petition for the m arket. Contracts with low fixed private investm ent should be 
subject to frequent re-bidding. The re-bidding process itself should be open and m ake it 
possible for the incum bent to actually lose the contract. Since capital-intensive private 
investm ent precludes frequent re-bidding, the opportunity to win new bids (based, for 
exam ple, on reputation) em erges as the best way to ensure the benefits of com petition.  
Finally, there is extensive evidence that concession contracts change, regardless of the 
initial bidding process. G overnm ents often lack the bargaining power and negotiating 
experience to deal effectively with such contracts. Because of am biguity, contested inform ation 
about asset conditions, or unrealistic baseline assum ptions (e.g. about dem and or efficiency 
gains), contracts are frequently re-negotiated, typically to the advantage of the provider. O nce a 
firm  wins a contract, it can use its control over inform ation and analysis, as well as the 
im probability that governm ent will cancel the concession, to lobby for m ajor changes.3 
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According to W orld Bank research, long-term  concessions have had particularly unstable 
contracts. O f m ore than 1,000 private concession contracts awarded in Latin Am erica during 
the 1980s, for exam ple, over 60 percent had to be renegotiated within three years (G uasch 
2000). In the water and sanitation sector, 74 percent of all contracts in Latin Am erica have been 
renegotiated over the last 20 years, the m ajority of which were initiated by private operators 
(G uasch 2004). The high level of renegotiation underm ines the nature of the com petitive 
bidding process. W hile renegotiation m ay be expected in a long term  project where conditions 
change over the years, evidence from  Latin Am erica indicates that renegotiation takes place 
after an average of just 2.2 years from  the start of the contract (Estache et. al. 2003). 
The need to m inim ize risks is leading both governm ents and private firm s to adopt short-
term  m anagem ent contracts. The benefit to the governm ent is that if the firm ’s perform ance 
proves to be unacceptable, negative im pacts will be lim ited to a specific set of activities, rather 
than overall operational perform ance, and the contract can be term inated m uch m ore quickly 
and easily.  
3.5.2  Com petition in H ealth Care and Electricity Generation  
W hile the benefits from  com petition are difficult to achieve in utility services, m arket forces 
m ight have greater potential to discipline private providers in sectors with relatively low 
barriers to entry. M oreover, significant levels of private sector participation in health care and 
education have long been the norm  in m ost countries. In theory, com petition in these sectors 
could result in tangible benefits (M egginson and N etter 2001). H owever, it is im portant to 
consider the ways in which m arket failures and institutional constraints can m ilitate against 
achieving the M D G s in these two key service sectors. 
H ealth Care 
Privatisation advocates frequently cite health care as an area in which com petition can 
generate both greater efficiency and superior service. H owever, provision of health care is 
unusually com plex. There is a vast array of public, private, and m ixed system s that range from  
highly successful to dysfunctional. Unlike basic infrastructure, choosing health care reform  is not 
a m atter of selecting am ong a sm all num ber of distinct m odels with clear ownership 
arrangem ents, but rather of shaping incentives for public and private providers. Private health 
care typically em erges as a response to weak governm ent service, rather than a deliberate policy.  
Claim s about the private sector’s ability to im prove equity and choice in health care 
provision are challenged by considerable evidence about im perfect inform ation and m arket 
failure, which can arise from  “the strong power im balance between providers and patients” 
(Biljm akers and Lindner 2003). An em pirical review of contracted m edical services calls into 
question the private sector’s m anagem ent capabilities, the existence of genuine com petition 
and the translation of com petition into efficiency gains, as well as governm ent capacity to 
design and enforce appropriate contracts with private providers (W aelkens and G reindl 2001). 
A  W orld H ealth O rganisation literature review concludes, “the lim ited evidence available 
[about contractual efficiency] suggests that the conditions necessary for com petition, and 
even for contestability, are generally absent from  m ost areas of m ost low and m iddle-incom e 
countries.” (W H O  1998: 29). Advocating for greater com petition in healthcare provision in 
developing countries can end up m aking conditions worse, especially when increased efforts 
are concentrated on m arketing rather than adequate provision of services. 
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H ealth care is particularly subject to m arket failures related to lack of inform ation. 
According to an IM F researcher: “A llocation can not be based solely on cost-effectiveness, 
which focuses on efficiency, but ignores equity . . . M arkets alone cannot produce efficient 
outcom e in the health care sector, which suffers serious [m arket] failures due to asym m etry of 
inform ation, im perfect agency relationships, barriers to entry and m oral hazard.” Because 
patients know far less than physicians about how to ‘consum e’ health care, doctors have 
trem endous power to induce consum ption (H siao 2003). In other words, because of the 
supply-side particularities of health care, dem and can be induced with relatively little 
consideration for price. As a result, private provision that is not rigorously regulated is often 
characterized by over-supply. 
H ealth Insurance 
In addition to direct provision of health services, health insurance has em erged as an area in 
which international donors and governm ents have encouraged com petition. Yet private 
health insurance (PH I) reaches only a tiny fraction of people in developing countries. O nly 11 
developing countries in the world cover even 10 percent of total health expenditures through 
private insurance (see Table 3). For m arket enthusiasts, those num bers illustrate a trem endous 
potential for growth of PH I. For skeptics, they are evidence of the inherent lim itations for 
privatised risk-pooling in low-incom e countries with endem ic poverty. 
H ealth insurance is unique am ong the services that we are exam ining because the 
sector’s financial sustainability depends on risk pooling. Ideally insurers cover broadly, 
random ly and without discrim ination, so that the contributions of relatively healthy people 
cover the m edical costs of the m inority of the population with health problem s. In practice, 
privatised insurance has been plagued by inequity. O ne of the m ost fundam ental problem s is 
that PH I is usually available only to better off people and those who participate in the form al 
labour m arket. (M usgrove, et. al. 2002). That is, in a typical low-incom e country, only a m inority 
would even be considered for private insurance.   
In addition, even am ong those with sufficient incom e, incentives to reduce risk 
underm ine the equity of PH I coverage. In a review of insurance schem es adopted in Chile and 
Colom bia, a H arvard University health policy specialist identified several shortcom ings. Private 
com panies engage in ‘cream  skim m ing,’ using personal inform ation to exclude sick people 
and those likely to becom e sick (Bossart 2000). Research conducted by the Inter-Am erican 
D evelopm ent Bank on privatisation in Chile – a country with som e of the strongest institutions 
in the developing world – reports that health insurers “try to exclude beneficiaries who 
develop expensive illnesses.” The governm ent responded by requiring insurers to renew all 
policies upon request. H owever, the insurers “found a way around this obligation: they raise 
the price of the renewal plans while offering new plans with sim ilar benefits at the original 
lower prices to clients that do not represent as high a risk level” (Fischer, et. al. 2003).   
Even proponents of private insurance reinforce these concerns. According to an O ECD  
report, “PH I offers certain advantages over other form s of health financing. In general, PH I will 
offer personalized insurance packages and com petitive prem ium s, particularly to good-risk 
individuals. . . ” (D rechsler and Jutting 2005; em phasis added). Yet the fundam ental criticism  of 
extending PH I is precisely because it is offered disproportionately to ‘good risk individuals’ 
who can pay prem ium s from  their own incom e, leaving a population of poorer and sicker 
people to be covered by under-funded State health care. 
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TABLE 3 
Private H ealth Insurance in Latin Am erican and African Countries (2001) 
Latin America Importance of PHI* Africa Importance of PHI* 
Argentina  14.5 Algeria  1.3 
Barbados 7.9 Botswana  6.9 
Bolivia  2.6 Cape Verde  0.1 
Brazil  21.0 Côte d’Ivoire  8.7 
Chile  22.6 Egypt  0.3 
Colombia  11.9 Kenya  7.5 
Costa Rica  0.5 Madagascar  5.1 
Dominican Republic  0.3 Malawi  1.0 
Ecuador  4.7 Mali  11.5 
El Salvador 2.6 Morocco  13.8 
Guatemala  2.7 Mozambique  0.2 
Honduras  3.5 Namibia  23.2 
Jamaica  13.0 Niger  1.8 
Mexico  2.7 Rwanda  0.1 
Nicaragua  2.1 Senegal  3.5 
Panama  5.8 South Africa  42.3 
Paraguay  17.5 Tanzania  2.3 
Peru  7.2 Tunisia  5.4 
Suriname  0.3 Uganda  0.2 
Trinidad and Tobago  4.0 Zimbabwe  19.0 
Uruguay  37.4   
Venezuela 1.7   
* expenditure on private prepaid plans as a percentage of total expenditure on health: not including countries 
without PH I or where data were not available. Source: D reschsleri and Jutting 2005. 
Electricity Generation 
M arket failure in electricity generation has been widely docum ented, from  California to South 
Asia. Several special features of electricity m ake it particularly vulnerable to price m anipulation. 
M ost im portantly, electricity cannot be physically stored. M oreover, there m ust be sufficient 
supply available to m eet dem and at ‘peak’ hours, even though this level of supply is used only 
for a short tim e every day. 
Im plem entation of electricity restructuring requires considerable institutional capacity. 
According to an M IT econom ist’s review of the sector, steps necessary to achieve robust 
com petition are m any and com plex. This review concludes that while effective 
im plem entation of these m easures can yield significant efficiency gains and lower prices for all 
consum ers, attem pting such reform s entails serious risks for governm ents with weak 
regulatory institutions. “Creating a set of com plete m arkets that operate this quickly, at so 
m any locations, and without creating m arket power problem s is a significant challenge.” 
Perhaps m ost im portantly, the high inelasticity of dem and at peak operating levels can create 
extrem ely volatile spot prices that are “unusually susceptible to the creation of opportunities 
for suppliers to exercise m arket power unilaterally” (Joskow 2003). 
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The challenges of creating well-functioning electricity generation m arkets are dem onstrated 
m ost powerfully in developed countries, where regulatory institutions are m ore experienced 
and have far greater financial and personnel resources than in poor ones. According to the U S 
N ational Com m ission on Energy Policy, “Electric industry restructuring [in the U S] has derailed. 
The m assive blackout of August 14, 2003 certainly was not needed to underscore the point, 
but it adds urgency to the effort to find solutions. W holesale m arkets continue to evolve slowly 
and erratically but are im peded by state and federal conflict, regulatory and legislative 
uncertainty, m alfeasance, poor credit and outright collapses, of which Enron is only the m ost 
notorious.” Sim ilarly, the U S Federal Energy Regulatory Com m ission reported “evidence of 
m anipulation of both gas and electricity m arkets”. In western electricity m arkets the 
com m ission identified “abuses and m isconduct, such as taking unfair advantage of m arket 
rules, excessive pricing or bidding, and behavior that is not consistent with com petitive 
m arkets . . .” (G elinas 2003). 
3.6   EQ U ITY 
The UN  M illennium  D eclaration calls for the m anagem ent of global challenges in accordance 
with basic principles of equity and social justice. Equity is regarded as a fundam ental value, 
essential to international relations in the 21st century. H owever, the focus of m arket-oriented 
reform s has been on the operating efficiency of public utilities, not on their distributional im pact.   
The profit-centred incentive fram ework of the private sector is inconsistent with 
expansion of access to poor users. Investm ents in basic services are characterized by 
increasing returns to scale, network externalities and other positive spillovers. These ‘public 
good’ characteristics m ean that private supply of such investm ents will be far below the social 
optim um  – certainly below the level required to achieve the M D G s. Even if there are adequate 
total savings in the econom y, providing adequate supplies of such public goods im plies 
m obilizing resources through public rather than private channels.   
For exam ple, even if roads can be financed by tolls, if that investm ent will deny large 
num bers of poor people access to transportation, it would be better to use general revenue to 
prom ote universal free access. This assum es, of course, that general revenue could be m ade 
available for this purpose. Sim ilarly, the social returns to m ass im m unisation m ake public 
financing m ore desirable than private financing if the latter leads to lim ited public uptake of 
services (U N  M illennium  Project 2005). In a frank assessm ent of the gap between initial 
expectations and actual outcom e in infrastructure services, a W orld Bank privatisation 
specialist notes:  
As for the poorest, m ost reform ing governm ents would sim ply m ake sure that they would im pose 
universal service obligations (U SO ) to avoid possible exclusions from  any segm ents of the population. 
There was, however, very little discussion or com m itm ent m ade with respect to the financing of these 
U SO  . . . For the poorest of the poor . . . the speed at which access rates have im proved [under 
privatisation] has been such that m any have not yet been included in the investm ent plans of the 
utilities . . . M oreover, cream -skim m ing in the design of reform s has often left rural and sub-urban areas 
out of the service obligations. (Estache 2004: 7, 15). 
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Pricing of services becom es essentially a political issue. H owever, privatisation can push 
up prices where weak regulation lim its the State’s ability to determ ine the costs on which 
requests for price increases are based. In G uinea, for instance, expansion of access after 
privatisation was less than anticipated because prices were so high (M enard and Clarke 2000). 
Because private investors will expect a return on capital to m eet their com m ercial objectives, 
tariffs will be pushed up. In Bolivia, for exam ple, prices increased dram atically with the award 
of a concession contract in Cochabam ba (which subsequently collapsed following huge public 
protests). As well as covering future investm ent, the tariff increase incorporated the need to 
guarantee a 16 percent rate of return on capital to the private concession-holder.  
In addition to the pricing of services, access to services is also affected by the private firm ’s 
revenue focus. Their initial em phasis is on short term  m easures that im m ediately affect cash 
flow with little cost. W hile at first sight privatisation m ay appear to increase the num ber of 
connections, closer exam ination of the rate of disconnections m ay m ean that a large 
proportion of connections are inactive. Evidence from  privatised water utilities in sub-Saharan 
Africa indicates high levels of disconnection for non-paym ent. In Senegal in 2002 as m any as 
12 percent of connections were not in service in the capital, and even m ore outside the capital. 
In Côte d’Ivoire, private sector custom ers have been routinely cut-off for non-paym ent, even 
though the paym ent system  was designed to discourage non-paym ent by providing a free 
one-tim e ‘social’ connection. In 1997, it was estim ated that the private water firm , SO D ECI, 
carried out 17,000 forced disconnections. In som e of SO D ECI’s areas of operation, up to 20 per 
cent of connections were reported to be inactive in 2002 (Trem olet et al. 2002).   
3.7  FRAGM EN TATIO N  AN D  TW O -TIERED  SERVICE 
W hile weaknesses in State provision have turned m any governm ents partly toward the private 
sector, there are considerable disadvantages in a fragm ented, two-tiered service. Indeed, dual 
service tiers were a large part of the original m otivation to nationalize water service provision 
in developed countries (H all 2003).  
Proponents of privatisation and com petition argue that reform s should increase the 
accountability of both State and private providers. Yet the policies that they cham pion do little 
to prom ote accountability. Rather, they facilitate the exit of service users from  public provision – 
typically those with the highest incom es. Pressure for reform ing governm ent services is 
possible only to the extent that vocal or influential citizens use those services. Yet when 
m iddle class and com m ercial users are able to opt out of State provision, they lose any interest 
in holding the State to account.   
The ‘opt out’ trend is evident in initiatives to prom ote private insurance. The risk-averse 
incentives of insurers have broad im plications for the level of equity in the health sector. As a 
consequence of cream -skim m ing, com petitive privatised insurance encourages the 
developm ent of a “two-tiered system , with the beneficiaries of private plans having 
significantly higher levels of services and expenditure than the public insurance system . This 
outcom e is particularly likely if . . . em ployees will be able to ‘opt out’ of the social insurance 
schem e and take their contributions with them  to private plans” (Bossert 2000: 10).  
N um erous country reports in the 2003 Social Watch Report found that public education 
system s were eroded by the prom otion of private schools. The report on Chile reported that 
education reform  helped channel public subsidies to private schools that were free to select 
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am ong the m ost prepared and well-off students. As m unicipalities with fewer resources were 
forced to take on m ore low-incom e students, quality suffered, inducing m ore parents to reject 
free public education. The Costa Rica report described a private school boom  that drew better-
off students away from  public schools with declining resources, and concluded that 
“education has changed from  being a m echanism  for social m obility to becom ing an 
instrum ent of status and exclusion.” The M alaysia report repeated an alarm ingly com m on 
them e: “two system s have em erged: higher quality private education for those who can afford 
it and poorer quality public education for those with low incom es.”  
3.8  ERO SIO N  O F TH E STATE  
The ideals that have traditionally m otivated the public sector include citizenship, equality, 
representation and justice. The widespread adoption of neo-liberal reform s is replacing these 
public service norm s with m arket driven norm s, such as efficiency, productivity and 
profitability, which are eroding the principles of public service. Such an approach m ight 
encourage public service m anagers to pay greater attention to increasing productivity rather 
than responding to the changing needs and expectations of citizens. Sim ilarly, such reform s 
are associated with a narrowing of the com position of service recipients, as the public sector is 
encouraged to pay greater attention to m arket dem and while neglecting the overall well-
being of citizens (H aque 2001). 
The neo-liberal aim  of creating a State that is a facilitator rather than a provider of services 
ultim ately reduces the capacity of the State to m eet the needs of citizens. The activity of 
regulation is very different from  that of direct im plem entation and m oves the State further 
away from  the citizens that it is supposed to serve. The creation of ‘autonom ous’ governm ent 
agencies m ight reduce traditional form s of political m anipulation. H owever, regulation can 
never replace politics itself. As a result, the establishm ent of arm s-length governm ent m ight 
sim ply prom ote greater influence by the private entities that are regulated, while underm ining 
traditional system s of public scrutiny and accountability.  
The capacity of the State hinges on its credibility and on the degree of public trust in 
public service. This, in turn, is affected by the confidence of public em ployees them selves. 
H aque (2001) cites num erous exam ples that dem onstrate that self-confidence and perceived 
job security in public sector em ployees have declined, with the result that increasing num bers 
want to leave the public sector. H e also points to growing dissatisfaction of citizens with the 
public sector. In part, this can be attributed to persistent derogatory connotations attached to 
the public sector, perpetuated by business, neo-liberal political leaders, the m edia and 
international financing institutions, which help legitim ize and finance m arket reform s.  
Public sector m anagem ent has suffered greatly under austerity program s sponsored by 
international financial institutions (IFIs). Critics of m ism anagem ent caution against sending 
‘good m oney after bad’. Yet inadequate resources lock governm ents into a vicious cycle of 
poor governance. Countries without resources cannot afford to pay decent salaries or establish 
institutions that prevent political abuse of the State sector. This results in large-scale 
inefficiencies and wasted resources (U N  M illennium  Project 2005:32). 
In line with other aspects of neo-liberal tight budget constraints, extensive reliance on 
private sector participation and com m ercialisation reflects a system atic effort to scale back or 
circum vent the State, rather than strengthen it. In developed countries, governm ent accounts 
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for m ore than 40 per cent of G D P, while in developing countries it is less than 20 percent of 
G D P. N o industrialized country spends less than 5 percent of G D P on governm ent-financed 
health services, but m ost developing countries spend less than half of this proportion. Rarely 
do industrialized countries spend less than 4.5 per cent of G D P on publicly financed education 
but few developing countries spend as m uch (M ehrotra 2003).  
In addition to eroding public resources, IFI policy pressure can underm ine the legitim acy of 
the State to undertake any kind of program . Policies that are perceived to originate in W ashington-
based institutions are typically adopted without public participation, and often without even 
m inim al legislative input. Policies that are im plem ented without public dialogue or parliam entary 
debate are unlikely to correspond well with governm ent capabilities and experience.  
4  TH E LACK  OF EM PIRICAL SU PPORT FOR PRIVATISATION 
O verall, there is little em pirical support for preferring privatisation of public services. Evidence 
suggests that public services perform  about the sam e as private ones even on strict econom ic 
term s, where private providers would be expected to outshine governm ent. A  recent review of 
infrastructure perform ance conducted by a team  of W orld Bank researchers m ade the 
following conclusion. “For utilities, ownership often does not m atter as m uch as som etim es 
argued. M ost cross-country studies find no statistically significant difference in efficiency 
scores between public and private providers” (Estache, Perelm an and Trujillo 2004). 
H ence, given the evidence, what explains the widespread (and widely reported) 
perception that privatized services are superior to public ones? There is broad scope for widely 
different interpretations of an individual case. Em pirical assessm ents of the im pact of reform s 
such as privatisation are often flawed for several reasons.  
 
Counterfactual thinking. Proponents of m arket reform  often use the ‘counterfactual of inaction’. 
It is com m on to com pare best-case private provision scenarios with the continuation of failing 
public service. That is, privatisation enthusiasts assum e that the status quo – e.g., insufficient 
resources and poor m anagem ent – will continue indefinitely in the absence of their reform  
approach. For exam ple, according to the IFC, “private investm ent and m anagem ent are crucial 
in achieving efficiency gains, in extending access, in realizing lower costs, and in avoiding the 
poor governance characteristic of m ost parastatal utilities. H owever, new instrum ents and 
approaches will be needed to attract this private participation, and it is unlikely to com e 
without som e public or donor-provided support. The outcome w ill still be clearly superior to 
continued government ow nership and management” (IFC 2003, em phasis added). Sim ilarly, 
while a W orld Bank private sector specialist recognizes problem s caused by private contracting 
in water and electricity, he concludes: “W hile som e governm ents have not been able to deal 
successfully with [problem s of privatisation], these problem s will not be solved by a reversion 
to public provision” (H arris 2003). For som e cham pions of private sector provision, the 
alternative of reform  of governm ent services and im proved accountability for the State is 
sim ply not considered an option. 
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Inappropriate indicators. Policy research often focuses on param eters and indicators that are 
priorities for private providers or finance m inistries, such as profitability, rather than indicators 
that m atter m ore to poor people, such as access and affordability. For exam ple, according to 
an evaluation of the privatised water and electricity provider SEEG  in G abon: “the com pany’s 
financial profitability and their ability to m axim ize profits …  rem ains the m ain test of whether 
the concession arrangem ent is successful” (Trem olet and N eale 2002: 50). Senegal’s water 
concession, a showcase of innovative contract design, resulted in im proved quality and m ore 
custom ers. Yet the greatest price hikes have affected water standposts, nam ely, the water 
source used overwhelm ingly by the poorest users (Brocklehurst and Janssens 2004). An overall 
assessm ent of service provision outcom es depends on the priorities attached to the im pact on 
different groups. Privatisation affects, in a variety of ways, num erous stakeholders, such as 
consum ers (connected and unconnected), producers, em ployees and State power holders. The 
M D G  perspective focuses on the delivery to the poor. This m eans that policy outcom es need to 
focus on affordability, access and the treatm ent of non-payers.  
 
Rigging the game. Policies have becom e associated with particular benefits that are an artificial 
by-product, rather than an intrinsic feature, of the specific reform . A  key exam ple is the release 
of donor funds contingent on the im plem entation of privatisation. Indeed, the im position of a 
loan condition that requires private sector participation is tantam ount to creating a 
counterfactual of financial inaction. Conditionality often gives a cash-strapped governm ent 
the choice between privatisation with resources and the continuation of a fiscally starved 
public service. M oreover, privatisation m ight accom pany num erous actions that im prove 
perform ance, but that have nothing to do with ownership itself: raising tariffs for the non-poor 
or expanding access to form erly excluded areas. As a result of selective financing, privatisation 
prom oters have been able to point to num erous successes that result alm ost entirely from  
greater resources, such as m ore connections installed, better water pressure and greater 
reliability of service.   
 
Selection bias. Evaluation of the relative perform ance of privatised utilities is subject to 
selection bias. Privatised enterprises typically share certain positive characteristics that will 
affect subsequent perform ance. For exam ple, in the water sector, the perform ance of 
privatised services is typically related to the perform ance of the public service that the private 
sector replaced. In Africa, for exam ple, two water sector privatisations that are considered 
successful (for G abon and Senegal) were already perform ing well before privatisation, m aking 
them  suitable candidates for sale (Bayliss 2003). A  W orld Bank political analysis of water sector 
reform  concluded that privatisation “will be m ore likely in cities where the water price is closer 
to cost recovery at the start of reform s” (Shirley 2000: 7). Indeed, from  a business perspective, a 
service should dem onstrate satisfactory financial perform ance even to be considered a 
suitable candidate for private sector participation.  
 
Time frame. The perform ance of a privatised service can vary significantly depending on when 
it is assessed. In G uinea, water services im proved for the wealthy for a short tim e but the lease 
was not renewed after ten years (partly due to water price hikes). D espite lim itations with the  
 
24 International Poverty Centre W orking Paper nº 22 
policy, it was regarded as a success in som e ways (M enard and Clarke 2000). But since the 
expiry of the contract in 2000, water supplies have been worse than ever. By the end of 2003 it 
was reported that “thousands of m en and wom en wander the city every day with containers in 
their hands looking for drinkable water.”4 Thus, taking a long–term  perspective, privatisation 
has failed to deliver. For several years the M aynilad water concession in M anila was touted as a 
showcase of successful water privatisation. The com pany’s m ultiple requests for rate hikes and 
its ultim ate financial collapse revealed the concession’s m ism anagem ent (Esguerra 2003). In 
the U .S., neo-liberal reform ers presented California’s electricity sector deregulation as evidence 
of the superiority of unfettered m arkets. The subsequent collusion of generation com panies 
and the m anipulation of spot m arket prices eventually cost consum ers billions of dollars and 
led to a national debate over regulatory requirem ents for the energy sector.  
 
N arrow  parameters: It is not difficult to find particular cases in which privatised services have 
expanded access for the poor. H owever, such success stories typically involve significant 
injections of governm ent or donor financing. Em pirical studies on the im pact of privatisation 
also often neglect to consider the wider policy context. Research by G aliani et al. (2005) finds 
that child m ortality fell by 5-7 per cent, m ainly in poor households in areas of Argentina that 
had privatised their water supply – an outcom e linked directly to greater water access. 
H owever, the research fails to indicate how the expansion was financed. The biggest water 
privatisation in the country was the privatisation of Aguas Argentinas, and large increases in 
num bers of connections were achieved after privatisation. Yet m uch of the initial investm ent 
was funded by loans from  the W orld Bank, ID B and the European Investm ent Bank, which 
together provided about U S$ 500 m illion – enough to cover m ajor financial needs for the first 
three years (Biche 1998). A rguably, the public sector could have carried out the investm ent if 
such funds had been m ade available. Furtherm ore, tensions grew between the firm  and 
governm ent following the freezing of prices in 2001. The m ajor investor in the project, Suez, 
eventually pulled out of the contract, in Septem ber 2005.5  
5  FINANCING OF PU BLIC SERVICES 
Large am ounts of investm ent are required to achieve the M D G s, both to cover capital and 
recurrent expenditure. According to the UN  M illennium  Project, only with a huge push in basic 
investm ents in key sectors (roads, electricity, ports, water and sanitation, nutrition, disease 
control, education) can the poverty trap in low-incom e econom ies be overcom e (U N  M illennium  
Project 2005). W hile there is consensus on the need for greater investm ent, less clear is how 
m uch is required, in what tim e fram e, and how these investm ents should be financed.  
W hile m any estim ates have been m ade, nobody really knows precisely how m uch m oney 
is required to achieve the M D G s (Estache 2004). D ata on infrastructure finance are hazy due to 
lack of official statistics; estim ates vary depending on the assum ptions m ade. According to the 
G lobal M onitoring Report, it is estim ated that in sub-Saharan Africa, infrastructure investm ent 
of around U S$ 17-22bn is needed from  2005 to 2015, including both capital and m aintenance 
expenditure. Estim ates place current public infrastructure investm ent at about U S$ 6bn a year 
and private com m itm ents are around U S$ 4bn. Thus the infrastructure financing gap is around 
U S$ 7-12bn a year or 4.5 per cent of G D P (G M P 2005).  
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In the water sector, it is estim ated that to achieve the M D G  target, annual investm ent  
in developing countries m ust increase from  U S $9bn to U S$ 12bn and for sanitation from   
U S$ 4bn to U S$ 18bn. About one third of this investm ent is needed in East Asia and the Pacific, 
close to one-third in South Asia and nearly one fifth in sub-Saharan Africa (G M P 2005).  
Certain features of infrastructure investm ents in developing countries affect financing 
issues. M ost costs are incurred in foreign exchange (U S$) and revenues are paid in dom estic 
currency, leading to the risk of currency fluctuation. The level of finance required for 
infrastructure investm ent can vastly exceed the capacity of dom estic capital m arkets.  
This m eans that international borrowing is required. In addition, the payback period for 
infrastructure investm ents can last for 20 to 30 years, creating long-term  uncertainty and 
increasing the risk prem ium  that investors dem and.  
H istorically, the vast m ajority of infrastructure finance has com e from  the public sector. 
D espite the push for privatisation since the early 1990s, approxim ately 70 per cent of 
infrastructure investm ent in developing countries is financed by governm ents or public utilities 
from  their own resources or from  non-concessional borrowing. The private sector accounts for 
around 20-25 per cent and official developm ent assistance for 5-10 per cent (Estache 2004, 
D FID  2002). In the poorer countries of Asia and Africa, there has been far less private sector 
investm ent than in countries with higher incom es. O D A  greatly exceeds private capital flows 
(D FID  2002). In sum , even if there were progress in increasing private sector participation, the 
bulk of financing would need to com e from  the public sector and O D A  (G M P 2005).  
5.1  PRIVATE SECTO R FIN AN CE 
In the early 1990s, there was substantial optim ism  regarding private sector investm ent in 
infrastructure and initial results were prom ising. H owever, private investm ent peaked in 1997 
and has tailed off since then. In Latin Am erica, “Very roughly, infrastructure investm ent levels 
today average 40-50 percent of what they were 10-15 years ago . . .” (Estache 2004:8). 
Furtherm ore, the private sector has failed to invest in areas of greatest need. Between 1995 
and 2004, m ore than 70 per cent of private sector infrastructure investm ent went to 
telecom m unications and less than three per cent to water and sewerage (see Table 4). 
The annual average private investm ent in the water sector between 1990 and 2000 was 
U S$ 2.7bn, and this fell to U S$ 1.9bn over the period 2001-2004. This can be com pared with 
the estim ated annual investm ent required in the water sector to achieve the M D G s, which is 
around U S$ 6.7bn. The decline in investm ent flows reflects changes in the size and type of 
water projects having private sector participation. The average project size fell from  U S$ 156m  
in 1999 to U S$ 59m  in 2004, but the average annual num ber of projects changed only from  28 
in 1995-2000 to 27 in 2001-2004 (Izaguirre and H unt 2005).  
Clearly the private sector is not going to be the m ain source of finance for the M D G s. As a 
form er British Environm ent M inister put it: “Private sector finance will certainly be im portant 
but it will generally not be used for basic services . . . private sector investm ent is at present 
insignificant at providing basic water and sanitation services to the very people who m ost 
need it” (M eacher 2001). Even those who cham pion private investm ent have com e to the sam e 
conclusion. The W orld Panel on Financing W ater Infrastructure, chaired by form er IM F D irector 
M ichel Cam dessus, conceded that “com pared with other types of infrastructure, the water 
sector has been the least attractive to private investors” (W inpenny 2003). 
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TABLE 4 
Investm ent in infrastructure projects w ith private participation in developing countries by sector 
and region 1995-2004 (U S$ billions) 
 Total Percentage 
By Sector   
Electricity 207 18.88 
Natural Gas 34 0.94 
Water and Sewerage 33 2.96 
Telecommunications 375 70.20 
Transport 99 7.02 
Total 748 100.00 
By Region   
East Asia and Pacific 161 13.57 
Europe and Central Asia 133 19.50 
Latin America and Caribbean 326 27.15 
MENA 39 17.00 
South Asia 51 14.98 
Sub-Saharan Africa 38 7.64 
Total 748 100.00 
Adapted from  Izaguirre (2005). 
 
M oreover, m uch of the investm ent that is privately financed com es from  taxpayers  
or end users. As discussed earlier, infrastructure projects are underwritten by a governm ent 
com m itm ent to pay for a fixed output at a price agreed on in foreign exchange. W here 
construction is carried out by the private sector, the governm ent still has to pay – although 
paym ent m ight be deferred or fall under an alternative budget heading. In D elhi, the liabilities 
of the electricity distribution utility were transferred to the State before privatisation, so that 
the private firm  started with a clean slate (Agarwal, et. al. 2003).  
Such financing arrangem ents are essential for risk-averse investors, but for the 
governm ent, they are inflexible and expensive. In addition, the private sector generally pays  
a higher cost for capital than the public sector, so costs could be higher with private sector 
involvem ent. For privatisation to be beneficial, it needs to result in efficiency gains that m ore 
than offset higher private sector borrowing costs and on this “the theory is am biguous and the 
em pirical evidence is m ixed” (IM F 2004:14).   
5.2  U SER FEES 
A  key reason often highlighted for the poor financial perform ance of State service providers is 
that prices charged to end users have been too low. There is a widespread belief that key 
public services have been ‘under-priced’.6 The lam entable state of public health care is a m ajor 
reason why donors and governm ents routinely call for increased user fees. Pricing of services is 
ultim ately a political decision. Services can be com pletely subsidized or all costs can be 
recovered from  users. But where there is com petition for fiscal resources, governm ents are 
increasingly choosing to target subsidies to those who are m ost needy and to recoup costs 
through tariffs on m ore affluent users.  
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D ecisions about cost recovery should address two fundam ental questions: which people 
should be eligible for below-cost or free service, and how m uch, if any, of a service should be 
subsidized with funds from  general taxes? (See Box 2.) A lthough user fees can act as a 
rationing tool to lim it the use of scarce resources, the drawback of this approach is that it is 
likely to prevent the access of the poor to vital services. 
Support for increasing reliance on user fees (in the water sector) stem s from  ‘willingness-
to-pay’ surveys that reveal that poor users often pay far higher rates for services than m ore 
wealthy consum ers. W here policy-m akers had in the past sought to provide cheap or free 
services to poor households, willingness-to-pay evidence justified the im position of fees on 
low incom e users.  
There has been increased focus on the targeting of subsidies, especially for basic utilities. 
W hile subsidised tariffs benefit those already connected, those who have connections are 
typically not the poorest. The subsidy needs to reach those outside the system . Evidence 
suggests that in electricity and water, equity is prom oted best by subsidizing connection 
charges rather than usage tariffs (Estache 2005).  
H istorically governm ents have cross-subsidized services by charging different rates for 
different users and by transferring revenues of profitable public services to those needing 
subsidies. For exam ple, profits from  telecom s and electricity have often been used to cover 
losses in water and sanitation. H owever, donors actively discourage the practice of cross 
subsidies between public services, preferring unbundling and strict financial ring-fencing. 
M oreover, privatisation itself underm ines cross-subsidies. It is not easy to sell enterprises that 
are m aking losses. Those that are saleable are usually profitable – or at least close to recovering 
full costs. Potentially profitable enterprises that do not recover costs are typically restructured 
with increased user fees in order to attract private investors. After the revenue source of 
profitable operations is rem oved, the State is left with loss-m aking enterprises. This can have 
negative effects on the governm ent’s fiscal position. M oreover, it leaves rem aining public 
services vulnerable to budgetary neglect.  
In som e cases, subsidies are provided to the private sector. In D elhi, for exam ple, the 
governm ent provided subsidies to the privatised electricity distribution com panies in the form  
of discounted power purchased from  the State-owned transm ission com pany in order to avoid 
the need for substantial tariff hikes. These subsidies are paid for through general taxation. O ne 
of the advantages cited in the D elhi privatisation is that by providing the subsidy through the 
power purchased, it is less obvious. “It avoids the need for the governm ent to give m oney 
directly to the private [firm ] which would be politically em barrassing in m ost countries” 
(Agarwal 2003:31). 
M uch of the debate over user fees is driven by W orld Bank loan conditions and research. 
The Bank has been careful not to prescribe user fees as a universal solution for financing 
services, and recognizes the role of subsidies in protecting the poor. H owever, it has also 
argued that user fees enable consum ers to hold providers accountable. That is, if service 
quality is unacceptable, even the poor can take their business elsewhere. 
The application of the ‘consum er power’ argum ent is lim ited, however, since it holds only 
for com petitive sectors. Consum ers cannot benefit from  choice when dealing with a m onopoly. 
That leaves health care, and in som e cases electricity generation. (Prim ary education m ight also 
be considered com petitive, but there is a virtual consensus against user fees in this sector.) 
M oreover, while the Bank has written sym pathetically about the need to exem pt poor people 
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from  user fees, its concerns about accountability can easily trum p principles of equity. W hile the 
2004 W orld D evelopm ent Report argues that poor people should not have to pay out-of-pocket 
for prim ary health services, a D FID  researcher com plains that  
the critical point of the fram ework com es at the question of whether you can distinguish the poor from  
the non-poor. If the answer is yes . . . then you can exem pt them . If the answer is no, then you need to 
decide whether the service can be adequately delivered without user fees. G iven the current shortages 
in health and education in sub-Saharan Africa, the general answer to this is that services cannot be 
adequately delivered without user fees. Basically, it m eans business as usual . . . (H utton 2004). 
 
The Bank’s halfway position involves an unavoidable judgm ent call that can be influenced 
by considerations that have little to do with poverty reduction, such as budget balancing. 
W hen is public sector accountability beyond hope? By claim ing that user fees are justified 
when policy-m akers pursue self-interested political goals or fail to hold public providers 
accountable (and are therefore unresponsive to their own citizens), the Bank creates a policy 
loophole for full cost recovery for virtually any poorly perform ing service, no m atter how poor 
its users m ight be. 
The argum ent for user fees carries an im plicit assum ption: enough consum ers have 
sufficient incom e to contribute revenues to the service. In the developing world, m any large 
cities have a m iddle class and working class that can pay for som e or all of the costs of basic 
services. H owever, in extrem ely poor cities, as well as low incom e peri-urban, provincial  
and rural areas, econom ic realities m ake user fees highly questionable. For exam ple, the 
expansion of infrastructure services in developing countries cannot be m et by user fees.  
In industrialized countries with universal service, the costs are spread over a large num ber  
of users. H owever, in low incom e countries, connection costs are high. Private water firm s 
have said that users in Africa, for exam ple, cannot afford to pay the am ounts required to 
increase access (Talbot 2002).   
For poor countries, the collection of all possible types of user fees, charges and individual 
contribution com bined would not provide sufficient resources to expand services as 
dram atically as would be required to m eet M D G  target 10 (“reduce by half the proportion of 
people without sustainable access to safe drinking water’’) (U N M P 2005d). A  research report 
conducted by a m ajor relief agency concluded that user fees “have been an ineffective form   
of health financing. In term s of revenue they bring in, this is relatively low, averaging from  5-10 
percent of recurrent budgets for health care” (Save the Children 2005). 
W hile user fees contribute little to service costs in low-incom e environm ents, they can 
cause serious negative consequences for poor people, and directly underm ine achievem ent of 
the M D G s. N um erous academ ic studies and policy analyses conclude that user fees for health 
care rarely m eet efficiency and equity goals, and are directly associated with reduced use of 
service, especially for the poor and vulnerable. For exam ple, there is evidence that user fees 
discourage poor patients from  com pleting treatm ent and cause delays in seeking treatm ent 
(Pearson 2004; H utton 2004; Save the Children 2005). In the water sector, user fees have put 
services beyond the reach of poor consum ers. Such fees were directly linked, for exam ple, to  
a deadly cholera outbreak in KwaZulu N atal, South Africa (Cottle and D eedat 2003). 
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BO X 2 
Findings from  the W orld H ealth Organization Com m ission on M acroeconom ics and H ealth 
M ore than a decade has passed since the introduction of user fees and yet m ost countries have not 
achieved the theorized benefits from  this adjunct to their health financing strategies. It is therefore 
im perative that international and national policy m akers adopt alternative sources and m echanism s to 
finance the health care of poor populations. In the short term , increased developm ent assistance for 
health from  donor countries, together with increased budget allocations for health interventions by the 
governm ents of developing countries, appears to be the only viable option. In the long term , strategies 
based on health insurance will be needed. From  the policy analysis perspective, the past and current 
failure of user fee schem es to m eet the expectations of its proponents suggests that the theoretical 
analysis predicting benefits requires re-exam ination . . .  
U ser fees refer to the paym ent of out-of-pocket charges at the tim e of use of health care. In this 
sense, they go beyond concretizing the idea that it is desirable for consum ers, regardless of their incom e, 
to m ake contributions to the financing of public health care in addition to those they m ake through 
taxes. It prescribes the tim ing of the contribution relative to the tim e of needing and receiving health 
care. This specification of tim ing evokes m arket m echanism s that profoundly influence the distribution 
of health care am ong potential consum ers . . .  
G iven the potential welfare losses to low-incom e consum ers resulting from  user fees and the 
associated reductions in consum ption of other goods, the goal of policy debates at this period m ight 
have been to establish whether it is indeed efficient to distribute any type of health care em ploying 
m echanism s that relied on user fees. H owever, for alm ost two decades, the debate was centred on 
im plem entation problem s that were presum ed to prevent the realization of illusive theoretical benefits. 
Critical analysis to ascertain that theory does in fact predict net benefits to individuals or society from  
user fees for health care has ceased to be central to the user fee debate . . .  
Proponents of user fees argue that in situations of free public provision of health care, where 
financing is also largely public, it is likely that.…  there is ‘excessive’ use of public facilities arising out  
of m oral hazard. Therefore user fees, which usually represent a sm all fraction of the true cost of 
production, are justified in order to prevent this excess use (inappropriately high consum ption). In 
reality, however, poor consum ers in developing countries currently m ost likely face significantly 
higher prices (access costs) than those that will lead to optim al consum ption of health care to 
enhance the global utility function . . .  
Source: A rhin-Tenkorang (2000: 5-8). 
 
Conversely, there is evidence of significant poverty reduction where user fees have been 
lifted. The rem oval of user fees in the education sector has led to great increases in school 
enrolm ent rates (D eininger and M puga 2003). In Uganda, the elim ination of health care fees 
im proved access and reduced probability of illness in a way that benefited the poor in 
particular. Reduced incidence of sickness also led to broader econom ic benefits, as people 
becam e m ore productive. Im portantly, however, im proved outcom es were due, in part, to 
com plem entary m easures following the elim ination of user fees, including greater health care 
funding and efforts to increase the supply of health care.  
In the water and electricity sectors, a com m on approach to applying subsidies is 
volum etric pricing, in which the first ‘bloc’ is heavily subsidized (or free), with subsequent blocs 
becom ing increasingly expensive. H owever, this approach m akes m etering m andatory, which 
m ay not be practical in very poor areas. In addition, while volum etric pricing can be 
progressive in principle, in practice, governm ents have political incentives to m ake the first 
bloc overly generous, providing subsidies for the non-poor.  
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The volum etric pricing approach can also have the perverse effect of penalizing large 
poor households or those who use shared connections, while benefiting sm all m iddle class 
households that consum e relatively little. Because it provides subsidies per household, and not 
per capita, it can underm ine poverty reduction efforts. H owever, determ ining subsidies 
through m ore com plex household characteristics, rather than consum ption levels, requires 
extensive survey data whose costs m ight be prohibitive.  
5.3  O FFICIAL D EVELO PM EN T ASSISTAN CE 
A id flows to developing countries have increased since 2001 following a decade of alm ost 
continuous decline. Between 2001 and 2003, O D A  increased by 12 per cent. But m uch m ore is 
needed, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Estim ates suggest that at least a doubling of O D A  is 
needed within the next five years to build sufficient m om entum  towards the M D G s (G M P 2005).  
W hile infrastructure com m itm ents from  m ultilateral developm ent banks fell from  about 
U S$ 18.0bn in 1996 to U S$ 13.5bn in 1999, by 2002 they had recovered to about U S$ 16.0bn 
(Estache 2004). But in 2002, the W orld Bank’s lending for water and sanitation projects, for 
instance, was only 25 percent of its annual average during 1993-97. According to the Bank’s 
form er U .S. Executive D irector, Carole Brookins, the Bank’s infrastructure investm ent lending 
declined by 50 percent during the 1990s, and even m ore steeply in the m iddle-incom e and 
European transition countries.7  
W here financing needs exceed the potential for dom estic resource m obilisation by 
governm ents, consum ers and external sources are required to m eet the gap. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, som e countries face a gap as large as 20-30 per cent of G D P. External finance will need 
to be grant-based because of the m agnitude of the investm ents involved, the extrem e poverty 
of the countries and the fact that the investm ents are unlikely to yield a return in the near 
future. D onors m aintain that users need to be able to bear operating costs, but this is highly 
unlikely in m any poor countries. For exam ple, in Ethiopia, where alm ost half of the population 
lives below the poverty line, consum ers are unlikely to finance the operation of rural water 
supplies or urban sanitation (U N  M illennium  Project 2005d:117). 
As the lim itations to private participation are increasingly apparent, donors are expected 
to return to public funding of infrastructure: “As it has becom e clear that im proving 
infrastructure services is difficult whether provision is public or private, the Bank G roup has 
becom e m ore open to supporting public as well as private projects” (W orld Bank 2005: i). 
W ater and sewerage is cited by the Bank as the sector m ost likely to rem ain in public hands. 
The Bank has resorted to considering lending to the public sector as a pragm atic response to 
the practical difficulties in securing private sector participation (W orld Bank 2005).  
5.4  G O VERN M EN T EXPEN D ITURE 
G iven the failings of the private sector and the vagaries of international aid, there is now 
recognition that the bulk of new investm ent in infrastructure will have to com e from  
governm ent. This calls for the reversal of the decline in public investm ent that persisted for 
m uch of the past decade (G lobal M onitoring Report 2005). N evertheless, som e donors still 
have m isgivings about State providers and still see the State’s role as one of facilitating the 
private sector. For exam ple, D FID  still prom otes policies that im prove conditions for the private 
sector: “with constrained public finance, donors should encourage governm ents to look at 
options for deploying funds to encourage private investm ent wherever feasible” (D FID  2002:21). 
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In Latin Am erica, fiscal adjustm ent led to a sharp contraction of public infrastructure 
investm ent, from  an average of 3.5 per cent of G D P in the early 1980s to 1.5 per cent at the end 
of the 1990s. A lthough infrastructure investm ent accounted for only a sm all part of overall 
public expenditure, contraction of infrastructure investm ent am ounted, on average, to about 
40 per cent of the observed fiscal adjustm ent. The steady drop in financing, in turn, eroded the 
quality and reach of public services, particularly in the context of a growing population. 
M oreover, the countries that attracted m ore private investm ent in Latin Am erica were those 
that had m aintained higher levels of public investm ent, suggesting that private and public 
investm ent are com plem ents rather than substitutes (Serven 2005). 
The contraction of public investm ent can adversely affect future incom e as basic services 
create assets that are im portant drivers of econom ic growth, which will itself generate revenue 
and fiscal space over the long term . A ttem pts to cut back on infrastructure spending have 
been self-defeating: “com pression of public investm ent in infrastructure can be, and has been, 
associated under a wide range of circum stances with lower econom ic growth and less efficient 
poverty alleviation, which in turn has [fueled] fiscal insolvency which was the m ain concern 
that expenditure cuts were supposed to address” (Estache 2004b:9).  
W hile acknowledging the im portance of public investm ent, the IM F has continued to 
em phasise the need for strict fiscal discipline and recom m ends traditional m easures to create 
m ore room  for spending: nam ely, increasing taxes, changing budgetary priorities and cutting 
wasteful spending. M oreover, the IM F insists that its stability packages m erely set lim its on 
spending and deficit levels, but do not dictate which cuts governm ents should m ake. It 
concludes that for political and patronage reasons, m ost governm ents have preferred to keep 
paying salaries, while neglecting long-term  investm ent in infrastructure (H em m ing and Ter-
M inassian 2004: 31).  
G overnm ents can raise funds for infrastructure finance by borrowing. This can be 
im proved by strengthening dom estic financial m arkets. O ne advantage of borrowing in 
dom estic currency is that it can reduce exchange rate losses. G overnm ents can also raise funds 
by issuing m unicipal bonds. In 2004, the Johannesburg City Council carried out a m unicipal 
bond issue to finance long-term  infrastructure projects. The bond issue also served to diversify 
funding sources that had been dom inated by banks, reducing the cost of borrowing and 
extending the funding m aturity profile to better m atch the city governm ent’s long term  assets. 
The credit rating for the bond issue was raised by a partial guarantee that allowed for an 
extension of the bond m aturity. H owever, bond issuance requires a strong legal and 
institutional fram ework. This approach will not be easily repeated in the rest of South Africa, let 
alone in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.  
G overnm ent borrowing is not encouraged by donors, who instead prefer to provide 
investm ent finance to the private sector. N um erous funding instrum ents have been 
established to prom ote private investm ent in infrastructure in developing countries, such as 
the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), the Public-Private Partnership for the 
U rban Environm ent (PPPUE), the Private Infrastructure D evelopm ent G roup (PID G) and the 
Em erging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF). The objective of these funds is to encourage 
recalcitrant private firm s to invest in developing country infrastructure. H owever, the evidence 
above suggests that this am ounts to flogging a dead horse. Infrastructure developm ent m ight 
be better served by facilitating governm ent rather than private sector borrowing for infrastructure.  
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There is also scope for revising the m eaning of fiscal space. The focus of the fiscal 
discipline im posed in the 1990s was on containing liquidity and expenditure on productive 
assets rather than addressing solvency and net worth. Infrastructure spending typically has a 
negative cash flow at first and for possibly up to about six years. Thus, liquidity targets tend to 
be biased against investm ent expenditure in favour of consum ption. Fiscal discipline that 
focuses on liquidity has im m ediate fiscal benefits but can im pede future growth, which can 
provide longer-term  revenue generation. The extent to which this affects infrastructure 
depends on the nature and effectiveness of governm ent spending patterns and its ability to 
capture the returns to infrastructure spending. Estache (2004) suggests revising the public 
sector accounting system s to create m ore fiscal space to take account of the possible trade offs 
between the long-term  returns to infrastructure expenditures and short-term  financial stability.  
6  CIVIC ENGAGEM ENT 
The developm ent com m unity now acknowledges the benefits of civil society participation in 
econom ic planning and policy-m aking. H owever, participation in the delivery and regulation 
of public services has not received corresponding attention in the developing world. 
Achieving m eaningful civic involvem ent in public service provision faces huge challenges: 
social exclusion, lack of institutionalized public processes, insufficient inform ation and capacity 
within civil society, political dom ination by elites, and opposition by rent-seeking groups (Peña 
and Solanes 2003: 17).  
Recent research on public health care services suggests that effective participation 
requires a strong State, capable regulatory institutions and a well-inform ed public (G oloobi-
M utebi 2005). In other words, the creation of participatory institutions, by itself, cannot create 
an inclusive political culture. Estache (2004) cites evidence, for exam ple, from  projects that 
claim  to be participatory, but are driven by special interests or elites.  
M arginalized groups are the constituencies with the strongest interest in putting poverty and 
equity issues at the centre of utility governance. A  num ber of governance reform s can contribute 
to overcom ing the obstacles to strengthening the voice of these groups. These include: 
 
Transparency. Participation m eans little if citizens lack access to relevant inform ation. For 
utilities, this includes data about quality, coverage, and the costs of operations and new 
investm ent. U nder full transparency, service provision contracts would be publicly disclosed 
for scrutiny and com m ent before being approved. Consum er advocacy organisations, 
academ ics and public interest lawyers can play a m ajor role in identifying am biguities, 
loopholes or unbalanced risk allocation, and help correct (or cancel) flawed contracts before 
they becom e legally binding. In this regard, when the provider wishes to keep inform ation 
secret, it should shoulder the burden of proof in m aking the case for non-disclosure. 
Transparency of regulatory decisions them selves can be guaranteed by statute (e.g. ’sunshine’ 
laws). Periodic public reporting in accessible m edia (and language) is an im portant regulatory 
responsibility that prom otes accountability.  
Transparency is also critical for providing the public with inform ation about service 
performance: who gets services, what kind, what level of quality, and at what cost. An 
innovative m echanism  for dissem inating such inform ation is a ‘Report Card’, a survey am ong 
service users that asks respondents to rank service perform ance along several dim ensions of 
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satisfaction and accessibility (Paul 1998; U N  H abitat 2004: 45-50; W orld Bank 2001). Report 
Cards can be powerful instrum ents for prom oting accountability. H owever, their effectiveness 
depends in large m easure on the willingness of governm ent to subject itself to the risk of 
public disclosure on perform ance, as well as on a robust news m edia that can dissem inate 
relevant inform ation to diverse stakeholders.  
Transparency should not be evaluated in term s of quantity of docum entation, but in 
term s of accessibility to regular citizens. Contrary to popular slogans, inform ation is not always 
power. Service providers that do not wish to be scrutinized m ight respond to inform ation 
requests by dum ping m ountains of data on the public, which can confuse or intim idate 
citizens and m ake action difficult. Inform ation about utilities in its purest form  – raw data – will 
not be com prehensible to m ost people. Efforts to synthesize, abridge and explain large 
am ounts of com plex data can facilitate participation.  
 
Inclusive process. An im portant area for future research concerns the scope of civic 
participation. To date, developm ent institutions have focused on individual consum er 
satisfaction, the m ain institutional m echanism s being codes of custom er rights and com plaint 
procedures. Accountability is conceived as the right of redress for service provision problem s, 
such as inaccurate or incom prehensible billing, poor quality and interrupted service. M ore 
recent approaches explore the conceptual leap required for civic participation in regulation 
itself, i.e., involvem ent in decisions that affect large num bers of people, such as pricing and 
investm ent (W ood 2005). 
Participatory regulation requires an institutionalized forum  in which different interests 
and constituencies can listen to one another and be heard. Em powerm ent entails actual voice 
within the proceedings that inform  regulatory decisions. In an inclusive process, hearings and 
form al reviews of perform ance and pricing issues are open to the public, and regulatory 
authorities take both questions and evidence from  representatives of citizen groups. 
Research on service provision in developed countries dem onstrates that a dem ocratic 
process is central to ensuring accountable service provision (O ppenheim , et. al. 2003). Case 
studies of civic engagem ent around the world suggest that citizen involvem ent in public 
service provision is both feasible and effective in achieving social policy goals (TN I 2005). 
N evertheless, the obstacles to establishing such institutions are considerable. 
Inclusiveness im poses m ajor adm inistrative costs, slows down decision-m aking, and can spark 
heated public disputes. Perhaps m ost im portantly, it can also erode the power of those who 
enjoy discretionary decision-m aking authority. Just as it m ay be im practical to create an 
autonom ous regulatory com m ission overnight, inclusive regulation m ay also evolve in stages, 
giving both officials and the public tim e to learn and adapt to m ore open processes. 
 
Capacity building. Access to inform ation and inclusion in decision-m aking proceedings do not, 
by them selves, ensure m eaningful participation in utility governance. Effective participation in 
water and energy decision-m aking requires, for instance, a considerable degree of technical 
sophistication and policy expertise. In short, sustainable participation requires capable 
representation of interests. Som e organised groups, such as com m ercial sectors, m ight be able 
to develop such capacity independently. W here civil society is highly developed, advocacy 
N G O s m ight be able to represent broader public interests. 
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In urban settings, a form al advocacy office represents one institutional response to 
represent residential (and especially low-incom e) consum ers at regulatory reviews, and to 
process appeals filed by households or groups. Such offices require public resources – or 
voluntary m echanism s –for regular funding that ensure independence and sustain a 
professional staff with legal and econom ic expertise.  
An equally am bitious approach to em powering citizens is the establishm ent of form al 
partnerships am ong civic groups, governm ent and the service provider. A lthough such 
arrangem ents are still experim ental, evidence suggests that they can m ake regulation of price, 
quality and service coverage m ore responsive to the needs of the poor (Trem olet and 
Browning 2002).  
7  CONCLU SION 
The preceding analysis has identified adverse poverty im plications associated with privatising 
public services, as well as with their com m ercialisation. D espite years of effort, privatisation has 
failed to close m uch of the gap in the delivery of basic services in developing countries. 
M oreover, where privatisation is associated with greater access for poor people, m uch, if not 
all, of the financing com es from  governm ent, rather than private investors.  
Achieving the M D G s requires governm ent to m ake explicit com m itm ents to fund public 
services, as well as to im prove the accountability of public sector providers to citizens. This 
working paper has highlighted num erous ways in which the application of m arket led policies 
can adversely affect basic service delivery.  
W hile som e of these reform s have im proved financial perform ance, the adoption of 
m arket-based fram eworks has – to varying degrees – put the policy em phasis on m eeting the 
needs of private sector players and diverted attention from  broadening access and m eeting 
the needs of the poor. The lim itations of m arket-oriented reform s should not becom e a 
pretext, however, to ignore weaknesses in State delivery system s. Rather, to the extent that 
governm ents pursue reform  m easures, they should prioritise the im provem ent and 
affordability of services for low-incom e households.  
H owever, describing flawed policies falls short of finding solutions. M ore difficult than 
identifying problem s with m arket-based reform s is proposing viable alternatives that m ake 
universal and affordable service provision possible. Public services fail poor people for three 
basic reasons: lack of resources, poor governance, and social exclusion. Achieving the M D G s 
requires overcom ing each of these obstacles.  
Resources 
The practical options for increasing financial resources for basic services are well-known. 
H owever, choosing the m ost effective and equitable option is likely to require a m ajor political 
com m itm ent on the part of governm ents. 
For large, ‘lum py’ investm ents such as for utilities, governm ents need to procure 
considerable sum s of capital. H owever, user fees cannot be used to pay huge up-front costs. 
Accordingly, m iddle-incom e countries should work to im prove their capacity to raise capital in 
both foreign and local financial m arkets. This is an objective to which developm ent banks can 
also contribute. 
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For extrem ely poor countries in which the vast m ajority of people cannot pay user fees, 
higher levels of foreign aid are likely to be the m ain m edium -term  solution. It is revealing that 
one of the m ost vociferous critics of O D A  and the ‘industry’ of international developm ent 
assistance, W orld Bank veteran W illiam  Easterly, proposes focusing aid resources on provision 
of basic services. “Such tasks include getting 12-cent doses of m alaria m edicines to m alaria 
victim s; distributing 10-cent doses of oral rehydration therapy to reduce the 1.8 m illion infant 
deaths from  dehydration due to diarrheal diseases last year; getting poor people clean water 
and bed nets to prevent diarrheal diseases and m alaria; getting textbooks to schoolchildren” 
(Easterly 2006). 
Today the W orld Bank, the regional developm ent banks and dozens of regional and 
bilateral aid agencies are involved in virtually every aspect of econom ic developm ent. Basic 
service provision is part of their agenda. But from  an M D G  perspective, there is a case to be 
m ade that it should be the central agenda. These institutions routinely counsel borrowing 
countries to better prioritise dom estic budgetary allocations. But they m ight m ost benefit 
these countries by taking their own advice: focusing grants and concessional loans on those 
projects whose m ain goal is to increase access of poor people to basic services. 
Governance 
This working paper docum ents the notable lim itations of privatisation in addressing the 
central challenge for im proving governance of basic services: accountability to service users. In 
particular, where regulatory capacity is weak, governm ents face overwhelm ing obstacles in 
m onitoring and enforcing contracts with sophisticated private sector providers. M oreover, 
som e of the ways in which privatisation has helped im prove governance – investing in 
technology, im proving efficiency, instituting perform ance incentives for m anagers and 
workers – have nothing to do with ownership per se. W ith political com m itm ent and adequate 
financing, public providers can dram atically im prove efficiency while rem aining subject to 
political oversight. 
A  central argum ent of privatisation proponents is that consum ers are in a better 
position to dem and quality services when they pay out-of-pocket. H owever, this is certainly 
not the case for natural m onopolies, such as utilities, since switching providers is not 
feasible. M ore fundam entally, from  an M D G  perspective, the argum ent im plies that poor 
people lacking the incom e to pay user fees are bound to be deprived of the benefits of 
accountable service provision.  
In contrast, this working paper argues that im poverished people will be able to dem and 
accountability as organised citizens, rather than as atom ised consum ers. Sim ply voting for 
leaders – itself a highly individualized action – is unlikely to ensure accountability in specific 
areas of governm ental responsibility, including basic services. H owever, developing countries 
are rapidly accum ulating experience in m ore focused and sophisticated institutional 
approaches to im proving service delivery. Current challenges include creating and sustaining 
non-partisan organisations whose m ission is to aggregate and professionally represent the 
interests of citizens in prom oting access to affordable services. 
Social Exclusion 
Political econom y research is largely dedicated to explaining why certain interest groups 
benefit from  public policies and resources while others are system atically excluded. It is no 
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secret that political leaders tend to neglect the needs of citizens who are poor, unorganised, 
and geographically rem ote from  urban centres. U nder such circum stance, increasing 
financial resources would do little to benefit the poor; it would sim ply reinforce existing 
patterns of privilege. 
O ne way to address the problem  of exclusion is to provoke a debate that goes beyond 
generalities about service provision. It is widely accepted that poor countries need m ore 
m oney for utilities, health care and education. But a significant proportion of the public 
budget goes toward priorities that have little to do with achieving the M D G s: upgrading 
existing water and electricity services, building large urban hospitals or sending m iddle class 
students to college.  
The point is not that such resource allocation decisions are always wrong or unfair. These 
are entirely legitim ate activities that can supply significant public goods and prom ote 
developm ent. Rather, the point is that spending public resources on services that tend to be 
used by wealthier citizens represents an opportunity cost for the priority struggle to end 
poverty: these resources could be used for objectives that are focused m ostly on poor people. 
A t the sam e tim e, for econom ic or geographic reasons, it is often im practical to extend a 
m odern, urban water system  to peri-urban or rural areas. O ther solutions, such as com m unity 
standpipes or pit latrines, m ight increase access to a basic service at m uch lower per capita 
cost. G overnm ents should not abandon a com m itm ent to increase access to higher education. 
But they m ay want to re-think how m any college degrees they finance with the general 
budget, and at what incom e level students should be supported. They should also determ ine 
how m uch of a trade-off higher education spending represents with regard to slowing 
progress in achieving universal prim ary education.  
Recent policy experiences reveal a propensity am ong governm ent officials and 
international developm ent professionals to find facile econom ic solutions for inherently social 
and political problem s. For exam ple, com m ercialisation of public services has been prom oted 
as a m eans to achieve financial self-sufficiency. H owever, in m ost countries there has never 
been even an im plicit governm ent position – m uch less a public consensus – about the degree 
to which basic services should ‘pay for them selves’. Few people argue against full public 
funding for police, environm ental protection agencies or prim ary education, because there is 
an underlying consensus that these services prom ote poverty reduction or provide public 
goods that cannot be achieved by m arkets alone. The research presented in this working 
paper suggests that sim ilar benefits are obtained from  public funding of other basic services, 
such as utilities and health care. 
Proponents of user fees m ake a valid argum ent that public funding is not pro-poor when 
services are captured prim arily by the urban m iddle class. They often point out that even when 
governm ent laws m andate universal access to basic services, such as prim ary education, in 
practice, privileged social groups get the lion’s share of the benefits. H owever, these pervasive 
problem s do not m ilitate against the need for public funding. Rather, they m erely dem onstrate 
how public spending decisions can be exclusionary. But this outcom e is not inevitable. 
The other narrowly econom ic solution explored in this paper is privatisation, which has 
been prom oted as a way of both m inim ising the influence of self-interested politicians and 
m axim ising the benefits of com petition. H owever, in addition to the serious governance 
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problem s that it creates, over a decade of experience has shown that private provision is not 
likely to address the needs of the poor. Rather, it re-locates social exclusion from  politics to 
m arkets. To the extent that private services do serve the poor, public resources are alm ost 
invariably behind the im provem ent.  
Because there are strong inducem ents to exclude poor and voiceless citizens under any 
kind of service provision arrangem ent, whether public or private, there is no substitute for 
political com m itm ent to dedicate public resources toward these groups. Perhaps m ore 
im portantly than their econom ic weaknesses, com m ercialisation and privatisation reduce the 
political pressure on governm ent leaders to take seriously the need to equitably allocate 
budgetary resources. W hen user fees contribute to self-financing or a long-term  concession 
sim ply transfers responsibility from  the State to a private com pany, politicians are no longer 
held accountable.  
The key to achieving the M D G s is a public discourse over the legitim ate role of 
governm ent in providing essential services and how it should prioritise com peting claim s from  
citizens for such services. But that discourse can be m eaningful only when governm ent m akes 
an explicit com m itm ent to public funding of services instead of opting to unload such 
responsibility onto the private sector. This working paper has argued that the public sector 
should clearly define the essential public services that it is obligated to provide and, in line 
with its m obilisation of both dom estic and external resources, progressively provide universal 
access to those services. 
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 NOTES 
 
1. For a detailed update on progress toward each of the M D G s broken down by geographic region, see D FID  (2005). 
2. A  com m on exam ple is a ‘pass-through’ on costs, under which a pre-set form ula adjusts tariffs autom atically so that 
specified cost changes, e.g., oil prices, key inputs, and exchange rate fluctuations, are im m ediately reflected as increases 
in the tariff, typically without regulatory review. The purported goal of autom atic tariff adjustm ent is to provide a secure 
revenue stream . H owever, the m echanism  underm ines incentives to m inim ise costs or avoid exposure to events beyond 
the control of governm ent or firm .   
3. For case studies detailing contractual changes that increased the concession’s price, see Esguerra (2003) and 
Brocklehurst and Janssens (2004). 
4. Agence France Presse, 17/12/2003 ‘G uinea capital lacks water, light and citizens want to know why”. 
5. ‘W ater row hits A rgentine capital’ www.bbc.co.uk 23/9/2005. 
6. Particularly water and sewerage, health and electricity services – although notably less so in education. Am ong the 
sectors addressed in this paper, prim ary education stands out as a public service largely insulated from  pressures to 
im pose user fees. Indeed, the W orld Bank has publicly declared that prim ary education should be financed through 
general revenues. The key rationale for this exception is that education – and the literacy and num eracy skills that it 
m akes possible – is a key to escaping poverty. M any also recognise education as a public good, benefiting not only 
individuals but also com m unities and nations, and unlikely to be supplied in sufficient quantities by m arkets alone. 
7. Transition New sletter (W orld Bank), Volum e 14/15, April 2004. 
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